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ABSTRACT 
There is a wide perception that bank net interest margins (NIMs) in Sub-Saharan Africa in general 
and South Africa in particular, are higher compared to other regions. The study investigates four 
commercial banks in South Africa with the aim of identifying the relevant factors affecting the 
behaviour of NIMs in commercial banking in South Africa, and draws comparisons with other 
markets. 
 
The study employs the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) data estimating technique to analyse net interest margins over the period 2000 to 
2010. The study takes note of Ho and Saunders’s seminal work produced in 1981, and subsequent 
extensions and modification by other authors and researchers. Net interest margins are modeled in a 
single-step together with explanatory variables driven from the theoretical model. Using data 
obtained from the Bankscope data base, the variables examined in the study are; competitive 
structure of the market, average operating costs, management’s propensity for risk aversion, credit 
risk exposure, the quantum of the bank’s operations, short-term money market interest rate volatility, 
the opportunity cost of holding reserves and quality of management running the institution. 
 
The findings of the study suggest that market power, average operating costs, degree of risk aversion, 
credit risk exposure, and size of operations are major factors explaining the behaviour of NIMs in 
South Africa. These variables are major in terms of the number of banks that exhibit statistical 
significance. Market power, interest rate volatility and opportunity cost of holding reserves are also 
relevant factors, although they affect fewer banks than the major factors.  
 
Comparison of South African net interest margins determinants with those from other regions reveals 
some fundamental differences. These differences indicate that banks from different countries and 
regions are faced with different operating environments and risk profiles that drive net interest 
margins. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Contextualisation of the study 
Net interest margins (NIMs) are the difference between the interest rates at which banks borrow and 
those at which they lend. NIMs have been a subject of much discussion in South Africa in recent 
years.  Concerns about the behaviour of banks were an important reason for the appointment of the 
Jali commission to lead an enquiry into the level of bank charges in the country (Competition 
Commission of South Africa, 2006). Though the enquiry did not look into interest margins 
specifically, the formal investigation was a symbolic indication of negative public opinion towards 
banking sector behaviour. 
 
In his budget speech for the 2010/2011 financial year, the finance minister, Mr Pravin Gordhan, 
committed to addressing the findings of the Jali enquiry into competition in banking. He conceded 
that the findings confirmed the many complaints that bank charges in South Africa are high and not 
transparent. The minister expressed his intention to ensure that bank fees are fairly set, are 
transparent and do not create unnecessary hardships. 
 
In 1998 the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) commissioned KPMG, an audit and tax advisory 
services company, to specifically study bank margins and related profitability in the South African 
banking sector. According to the resultant report, there is a widespread perception that South African 
banks in their capacity as intermediaries in the financial markets enjoy excessive net interest margins 
compared to other capital markets in the world (KPMG report, 1998:1). The banks are suspected to 
be generating excessive returns to investors at the expense of depositors and borrowers. The same 
report indicated that the public also believes that banks in South Africa customarily widen their 
interest margins by failing to pass on to borrowers the full extent of reductions in the funding costs 
when rates decline.  
 
According to Flamini, McDonald and Schumacher (2009:3), excessive bank returns are a common 
phenomenon throughout the developing world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. They calculated 
that average returns on assets in Sub-Saharan Africa, at two per cent over the last 10 years, appear 
 
 
2 
 
very profitable and significantly higher than in the developed world.  Many other researchers   
including Briguglio (1995) and Gelos (2006:3) held similar opinion as Flamini et al. (2009:3) that 
rates are higher in the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.  Findings from studies 
(Gelbard & Leite, 1999; Chirwa & Mlachila, 2004; Jayaraman & Sharma, 2003 (cited in Folawewo 
& Tennant, 2008:2) also added to the view that net interest margins are higher in the developing 
world than in the developed world. Such variation in margins across regions leads to the question of 
what the fair value of intermediation costs should be, and what drives these costs.  
  
Higher net interest margins are a hindrance to economic growth especially in developing countries 
which so patently require development (Zuzana & Tigran, 2008:3). Claeys and Vennet (2007:2) 
claim that in addition to hindering growth, higher margins are an indication of non-competitive 
market conditions and banking inefficiency. They also provided evidence of a causative link between 
degree of financial intermediation and subsequent economic growth. In agreement, Zuzana and 
Tigran (2008:2) observed that higher margins may lead to lower deposit rates that deter deposit 
savings, while high loan rates reduce investment opportunities for banks. Ndung’u and Ngugi in their 
study in 2000 (cited in Folawewo & Tennant, 2008:2) agreed by noting that high margins discourage 
savers, due to low returns on deposits. This limits financing access from potential borrowers. 
Martinez and Mody’s study in 2004 (cited in Chortareas, Garza-Garcia & Girardone 2011:3, & 
Zuzana and Tigran 2008:7) elucidated and noted that in emerging economies where capital markets 
are still underdeveloped and most firms and individuals rely on bank loans, high margins may hinder 
growth. They argued that it is therefore necessary that the intermediation function of the banks be 
carried out at the lowest possible cost in order to achieve greater social welfare. 
 
On the contrary, Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (2000:159) were of the view that higher margins are 
necessary to ensure viability of the banking system, strengthen bank capitalisation and solidify its 
financial position by creating additional buffers against future negative shocks. In essence, by 
strengthening a bank’s financial position, a bank is in a way taking out insurance against future 
turbulent times. Gorton and Winton (1998:622) shared the same opinion and believed that in less 
developed economies, relatively high bank margins may be necessary, at least initially, to sustain 
bank franchise value and avoid financial instability. Zuzana and Tigran (2008:3) and Flamini et al. 
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(2009:3) agreed that high bank profits are an important source of equity. Reinvesting bank profits 
should result in safer banks and the attainment of financial stability. 
 
Overall, high net interest margins can be viewed as a negative feature if they are associated with a 
low degree of efficiency, an indication of an insufficient regulatory banking environment and a high 
degree of information asymmetry. Yet, as Folawewo and Tennant (2008:2) pointed out, banking 
efficiency is critical to economic development because it has a direct influence on the mobilisation of 
investible resources. Quaden’s work in 2004 (cited in Folawewo & Tennant, 2008:2) suggested a 
critical link between bank efficiency and economic growth.  
 
Concerns at the level of bank profitability in South Africa create a perception that the country’s 
banking sector is less efficient and non-competitive compared to developed markets. Flamini et al. 
(2009:3) agreed and noted that if high returns are the result of market power, it could indicate some 
degree of inefficiency in banking services, a fact that could explain and justify the public perception 
of bank charges in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and South Africa in particular. If inefficiency were 
the case, it would imply that higher margins in South Africa may have a detrimental effect on 
economic growth.  
 
In order to assess banking sector competitiveness, net interest margins can be used as an indicator of 
bank efficiency levels. According to Folawewo and Tennant (2008:2), bank margins are a good 
measure of banking sector efficiency. Zuzana and Tigran (2008:2) concurred that the effectiveness of 
a banking system to direct funds is often measured by examining net interest margins. The size of the 
banking margin serves as an indicator of efficiency in the financial sector because it reflects the 
banks’ intermediation costs.  
 
The implications of banking sector inefficiencies and competitiveness have resulted in various 
studies and debates on what drives net interest margins in the first place. In addition, comparison of 
these margins across markets is not helpful if country-specific economic dynamics and risk profiles 
that may have an impact on margins are not first understood. Flamini et al. (2009:3) concurred with 
this observation and asserted that banks that operate in risky environments appear to have higher 
margins. They confirmed that the level of margins reflects bank-specific risk as well as non-
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diversifiable systemic risk associated with the macroeconomic environment. The suggestion is that 
higher margins are indicative of higher risk premiums which reflect through higher bank costs, as 
banks that operate in risky environments must be compensated accordingly. Risk, therefore, appears 
to be a good explanation for wider net interest margins. 
  
According to Folawewo and Tennant (2008:3), there is no convergence among studies on whether 
high net interest margins are caused by bank-specific factors or are imposed by the macroeconomic, 
regulatory or institutional environment in which the bank operates.  Numerous studies to determine 
the drivers of net interest margins have been conducted in the past, often with differing results. 
 
This study aims to determine significant factors that may affect net interest margins in South Africa’s 
banking sector using data obtained from Bankscope. The country-level study will allow the study to 
focus on bank-specific determinants as opposed to the macroeconomic or industry-specific factors 
that certainly affect all banks without exception. The second step, once the factors are established, is 
to draw comparison with other capital markets determinants which have been established in previous 
studies. The comparison will assist in establishing whether the South African net interest margins are 
comparatively higher and may reflect possible market inefficiencies.  
  
1.1.1  Net interest margins  
Before attempting to determine drivers of net interest margins in South Africa it is necessary to 
define net interest margin (NIM), as definitions vary widely across markets and even among 
financial institutions within the same country. Zhou and Wong (2008:41) defined NIM as a measure 
of the difference between the interest income generated by a bank or financial institution and the 
amount of interest paid out to lenders, relative to the interest-earning assets. The NIM basically 
reflects the difference between the interest rates banks borrow at, and those that they lend at.  
 
According to Brick (2007:4-5), NIM is similar in concept to Net Interest Spread (NIS) with NIS, 
however, being the nominal average difference between borrowing and lending rates without 
consideration of the fact that the earning assets and the borrowed funds may be different instruments 
and of different volumes. Brick further advises that the terms NIM and NIS are in most cases used 
interchangeably.  
 
 
5 
 
 
Zuzana and Tigran (2008:7) acknowledged the problems associated with defining and measuring 
bank net interest margins by indicating that the measuring of NIMs is non-standard. The non-
standard definition of NIM has led to some studies employing a ‘narrow’ definition while others 
employ a ‘wide’ definition of net interest margin. The narrow definition is based on using only 
deposits and loans, while the wide definition includes the impact of other banking activities such as 
securities and bank services.  
 
Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier’s observation in 2007 (cited in Zuzana and Tigran 2008:7) indicated 
that the impact of net interest margins varies across the definitions of the margins. They provided 
evidence that the capital adequacy ratio has a non-significant impact on the ‘narrow’ margin, while it 
has a negative impact on the ‘wide’ margin. This observation suggests that NIMs and their impacts 
vary widely, especially in developing markets, which may be due to market inefficiencies (Zuzana 
and Tigran, 2008:8). 
 
1.1.2 Overview of different markets considered in the study 
 Empirical evidence has shown that NIM levels in developing economies are persistently larger than 
in developed economies (Flamini et al. 2009:3). NIM drivers are thus assumed to vary across 
markets. It is therefore especially important to review the factors affecting NIMs in other markets of 
the world in order to draw informed comparisons with South Africa. 
  
Western Europe and specifically Britain and the United States of America are critical markets to 
review as they are considered to be benchmarks by virtue of their financial systems being the most 
developed. Comparison of the benchmark markets with the South African market will provide 
insight into how well the South African financial industry is developed. Studies by Angbazo (1997), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Guevara 
(2003), Emmanuelle (2003), Claeys and Vennet (2007), Mendes and Abreu (2007 and Zuzana and 
Tigran (2008) provide insight into the NIM structures in Europe and USA, while this study  attempts 
to determine the NIM structure in South Africa. 
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Claeys and Vennet (2007:2) considered Eastern Europe to have recently made considerable strides at 
deregulation in order to adapt their legal and financial infrastructure to ensure eligibility for 
European Union (EU) accession. According to the KPMG report (1998:3), a similar transformation 
took place in the South African banking sector in the eighties in response to deregulation of the 
foreign exchange markets. Due to this similar transformation, it will be therefore helpful to compare 
the NIM structures of the South African and the Eastern European markets in order to deduce 
whether there are any significant similarities or differences.  
 
Latin American, Asian and African countries, like South Africa, are considered to be developing 
countries. Considerable similarities of the NIM structures of these markets are therefore to be 
expected. A particularly important group of key developing markets are the emerging economies of 
the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). BRICS countries 
represent the status of key emerging markets. Though South Africa applied and was invited to join 
the original four members grouping, investors are sceptical about South Africa’s suitability as a 
BRICS member (Investment Outlook Summit, 2010). The summit is of the opinion that Turkey, 
Mexico, Indonesia, or even Nigeria, would be preferable to South Africa for BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) membership. This is due to the South African economy being a quarter of the size 
of the Russian economy which is the smallest BRIC economy. On average, South Africa’s growth 
rate and population are small compared with the BRIC average. The summit suggested that there is 
no natural fit between South Africa and the other BRICS countries.  
 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman, Jim O’Neill, who founded the BRIC phrase in 2001, 
believes that South Africa does not have a large enough economy and that it is struggling 
economically. This assertion, together with the scepticism towards South Africa’s suitability as a 
member of the BRIC economies, indicates that there may be disparities between South Africa’s 
financial architecture and that of the other member countries. Comparison of the NIM structures of 
South Africa and other BRICS countries will reflect whether or not these disparities exist. 
 
Studies on NIM structures in the other BRICS countries are provided by several researchers. Zhou 
and Wong (2008) studied mainland China while the Zuzana and Tigran (2008) study forms the basis 
of analysing Russian NIM structure. Alfanasieff, Lhacer and Nakana (2002) researched extensively 
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on Brazil. India completes the BRICS group of countries. However, no peer-reviewed literature 
could be accessed for India. 
 
Literature on other developing markets outside the BRICS countries could also be accessed, though 
not readily available in the case for Sub-Saharan Africa. Brock and Saurez (2000) and Chortareas, 
Garza-Garcia and Girardone (2011) studied Latin American countries, including Brazil. Brajas 
(1999) researched widely on Columbia. 
   
In Asia, Doliente (2003) carried out a multi-country study on the four South East Asian countries of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, while Guru, Staunton and Balashanmugam (2002) 
concentrated exclusively on the Malaysian market. In Africa, the studies by Naceur and Goaied 
(2001, 2008) and Naceur (2003) on Tunisia, are comprehensive. Flamini et al. (2009) and Chen 
(2009) provided multi-country studies on a few selected Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
There is a widespread perception in South Africa that local banks, in their capacity as intermediaries 
in the financial markets, enjoy excessive returns at the expense of depositors and borrowers (KPMG 
report 1998:1; Gordhan 2011:12; Competition Commission of South Africa 2006:8;). Bank profits in 
South Africa, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, are significantly higher than bank returns in other 
parts of the world (Flamini et al. 2009:3). The problem is that higher NIM levels may be an 
indication of unjustified banking costs and exploitable inefficiencies in the market. The perceptions 
about banking sector conduct lead to the question of whether banking costs are higher in South 
Africa than in other markets, and whether there could be exploitable inefficiencies in the South 
African market as compared to other markets. 
 
1.3 Objectives  
The first objective of this study is to determine the significant factors that affect NIM in South 
Africa. An empirical analysis is conducted to ascertain whether factors proposed by the theoretical 
framework are relevant to the South African case. Once these factors are established and known, a 
comparison will be made with the factors that affect NIMs in other capital markets. The comparison 
will ascertain whether the intermediation services offered by the South African banks are necessarily 
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costlier, and whether there are discrepancies that may be an indicator of inefficiencies in the local 
market that can be exploited. In addition, variation in net interest income is the key determinant of 
earnings volatility for banks, therefore it is important to understand the degree to which they could 
affect overall bank profitability (Hanweck and Ryu, 2005:4) 
 
The second objective of the study is to systematically compare the determinants of NIMs in South 
Africa with Europe, Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, Asia and specifically some of the 
BRICS countries and sub-Saharan Africa, to investigate whether or not there is a convergence of 
NIM behaviour.  
 
Determination of significant NIM drivers in South Africa and comparison with other markets will 
lead to an understanding of the cost and profit environment for the local banks. Disparities that may 
point to productivity and profitability inefficiencies in the South African market, and therefore the 
existence of possible exploitable arbitrage opportunities in the local market, may be identified. 
  
1.3.1 Main research question 
What are the dominant factors that determine NIM structures at commercial banks in South Africa? 
1.3.2 Sub-questions  
1 To what extent are the NIM structures in South Africa similar to those observed in other 
capital markets?  
2 To what extent can the relatively high NIMs in South Africa be attributed to low 
efficiencies? 
 
1.4 Research design 
The study of factors that influence bank net interest margins and profitability is a real-life problem. 
According to Zikmund (2003:7), problems of this nature require an applied research design to be 
conducted in the quantitative paradigm. Applied research is appropriate in providing answers about 
specific problems and can assist in making decisions about a particular phenomenon. 
  
This study will adopt the Dealer model framework provided in the seminal work of Ho and Saunders 
in 1981, and subsequently modified and extended by various other authors and researchers. 
 
 
9 
 
   
The theoretical model is represented as follows:-  
                                                            (1) 
The dependent variable, NIM, is the net interest margin. The independent variables are defined as 
follows:- 
 The Competitive structure of the market (HERF) 
 Average operating cost (C) on administering both loans and deposits 
 Degree of risk aversion (R) 
 Credit risk (Rc) 
 Size of operations (Q) 
 Volatility of money market interest rates  
 Opportunity cost of holding reserves (OC) 
 Quality of Management (QM) 
 The error term (ε) 
The above factors, being formulated from a theoretical construct, form the core of the fundamental 
determinants of NIMs (Maudos and Guevara, 2008:7). 
  
There are two distinct approaches to analysing the determinants of NIMs, namely the single-step 
approach and the two-step approach. The single-step process entails combining both the market and 
idiosyncratic factors in a single regression. Notable researchers who adopted this approach in their 
work include Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1997), Bartholdy, Boyle and Stover (1997), Barth, 
Nolle and Rice (1997), Zhou and Wong (2008), Zuzana and Tigran (2008), Claeys and Vennet 
(2007), McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo (1997). 
 
On the other hand, there are also a sizeable number of researchers who adopted a two-step process in 
their studies. These include Ho and Saunders (1981), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Brock and 
Saurez (2000) and Doliente (2003).  
 
The idea behind the two-step process is that the NIM comprises two portions: the pure margin and 
the market and institutional imperfection driven margin. According to Doliente (2003:5) the pure 
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margin is constant across all banks and is determined from the first step as the intercept of the 
regression. The pure spread is then treated as the dependable variable in the second step. 
 
Economic theory is not explicit on the merits and demerits of each of the two approaches. As a 
result, selection of which approach to apply is often left to the researcher’s judgment and discretion. 
However, it can be observed that there are more researchers and authors who have adopted the 
single-step function than a two-step function. This could be explained by the authors’ desire to keep 
it simple, rather than by any theoretical motivation. This study followed in the footsteps of the 
majority of studies and adopted the single-step approach which combines all the factors in a single 
regression specification due to its simplicity of manipulation. 
 
1.4.1  Sampling 
To ensure availability of data, the analysis of NIMs in this study is based on the four biggest South 
African commercial banks. These banks are ABSA Ltd, First Rand Ltd (FNB), Nedbank Ltd and 
Standard Bank Ltd. 
  
1.4.2  Data collection 
Secondary data was used for this study. Net interest margin data and data used to calculate the 
independent variables that included total assets, operational expenses, total equity, loans and deposits 
were obtained from Bankscope covering the period 2000 to 2010. Data on interest rate volatility for 
the same period was obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database.  
 
1.5 Significance of the study of net interest margins 
The factors that determine the level of commercial bank lending and deposit rates are important as 
they help the cost structure of a market to be understood. The factors also make it possible for 
reasonable comparisons of banking costs and inefficiencies to be made across and between markets. 
Comparison of NIM structures across markets gives an indication of the relative competitiveness of 
each market. 
 
In addition, research on determinants of bank net interest margins and profitability that relate to Sub-
Saharan Africa in general and South Africa in particular, is limited. This research therefore aims to 
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contribute to the building of a body of knowledge on the elements that affect net interest margins in 
South Africa. 
 
1.6 Research limitations 
Only the four biggest commercial banks in South Africa were analysed. The generalisation of the 
results to the broader context of all the 27 deposit accepting and loan issuing institutions in South 
Africa may be limited.  
 
1.7 Organisation of the study  
The research is structured into five chapters. Chapter one has provided the introduction, the 
background information, the focus of the study, the problem statement, the research design and the 
significance of the study. The chapter ends with an outline of the limitations that may affect the 
results of the study.  
 
Chapter two is concerned with the study and review of selected related literature on the theories, 
models and empirical work by other researchers on the subject of NIM. The selection and discussion 
of the approach and methodology employed for this study, and the collection of data, are dealt with 
in chapter three. The analysis of data and interpretation of the results is presented in chapter four. 
Chapter five contains a summary of the study findings, conclusions drawn from the findings, policy 
implications, and recommendations for further studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
OVERVIEW OF NET INTEREST MARGIN DRIVERS 
 
2.1  Introduction  
In the previous chapter, the public perception that banking costs may be disproportionately higher in 
the South African banking sector than in other markets was highlighted. It was also pointed out that 
higher net interest margins could be an indication of possible exploitable inefficiencies in the South 
African market. To understand each market’s cost environment it is necessary to identify and 
acknowledge possible differences in the fundamental elements that drive NIMs in different markets. 
This chapter deals with a review of related literature on theories and models postulated by various 
authors, as well as previous empirical work on determinants of NIMs carried out by various 
researchers in a number of capital markets.  
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:94) believed that literature review is critical when conducting a research 
study, as it provides theoretical background and the current body of knowledge on the topic in 
question. Literature review therefore establishes the contextual background of a study. It puts into 
perspective the significance of the problem. In addition, it provides substantive findings as well as 
past theoretical and methodological contributions to the topic in question. The result is a rational 
synthesis of available information and the gaining of new perspectives.  
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:96) also observed that the researcher’s role is integrated in the data 
collection process and therefore the need for the researcher to be well-versed in the related literature. 
By being knowledgeable in the literature the researcher can ensure that important information for 
observation and discussion is identified. It distinguishes what has been done and known from what 
needs to be done and to be known.  
 
This chapter will provide an extensive review of available literature related to the study of NIM 
drivers. The chapter is organised into four sections. The first section discusses the theories that 
underpin the study of NIM. The second section deals with some of the relevant models and empirical 
studies that have been conducted to date for different markets. The third section provides a summary 
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of the studies conducted in the various markets, and the fourth and last section provides the 
conclusion to the chapter. 
 
2.2   The theoretical background on net interest margins 
Several theoretical models explaining the fundamental factors that drive the net interest margins of 
commercial banks have been developed over time. The emphasis of all these models has typically 
been to derive an optimal net interest margin in the face of economic risk, the competitiveness of the 
market in which the bank operates, and the propensity of management to risk aversion (Hanweck and 
Ryu, 2005:7). 
 
According to Claeys and Vennet (2007:5), the study of NIMs is mainly rooted in the Industrial 
Organisation theory based on the Market Power (MP) framework. This theory has two competing 
paradigms: the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and the Relative Market Power (RMP) 
hypotheses on one hand and the Efficient-Structure (E-S) hypothesis on the other.  
 
2.2.1   The Market Power Framework 
The Market Power framework is based on the hypothesis that bank concentration and other 
constraints to competition create an impeded environment that impacts on bank behaviour and 
performance. Claeys and Vennet (2007:5) identified two hypotheses under the Market Power 
framework: the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and the Relative Market Power 
(RMP) hypotheses. The traditional SCP asserts that the positive relationship between margins and 
market structure indicates non-competitive pricing behaviour in more concentrated markets.  
 
The SCP hypothesis is essentially accepted if there is a positive relationship between market 
concentration (measured by concentration ratio) and performance (measured by profits) despite the 
firm’s efficiency (measured by market share). Claeys and Vennet (2007:5) defined market 
concentration as the extent to which a relatively small number of banks make up for a relatively large 
percentage of the market. It can be concluded that banks operating in highly concentrated markets 
will exert more market power and make more profit than banks in less concentrated markets, 
irrespective of their level of efficiency. The SCP framework was originated at Harvard University 
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and was derived from a neo-classical analysis of the market (American Agricultural Economics 
Association, 2006:1).  
2.2.1.1   The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis 
In the SCP paradigm, bank concentration is treated as the exogenous indicator of market power or an 
inverse indicator of level of competition. Bank prices and profitability are considered to be the 
endogenous indicators of bank conduct and performance respectively.  
 
According to Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2003:3), during the 1990s the SCP 
empirical models were generally static cross-section comparisons, or at best short-run in nature. 
However, the models have since evolved beyond this simple approach to include dynamic analyses 
of bank competition which examine the effects of bank behaviour over time.  
 
According to Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2003:3), the most popular method of 
measuring competition has been the Herfindahl Index (HHI). Maudos and Guevara (2003:10) 
defined the HHI, also known as the concentration index, as the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of the fifty largest firms, or a total of them all if they are less than fifty within the industry. It 
measures the size of the firms in relation to the industry and is an indicator of competition among 
them. Individual market shares are expressed as fractions. 
 
Recent studies have gone far in generalising beyond the SCP hypothesis by testing a number of 
different models of competitiveness. In addition, many authors and researchers have since identified 
problems with the HHI method of measuring competitiveness. As a result alternative measures have 
since emerged, including measures of market structure that take into account the possibility that 
different sizes and types of commercial banks may affect competitive conditions differently (Berger, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich, 2003:3). Berger et al. further indicated that the new measures 
of conduct and performance under the SCP framework now include indicators of efficiency, service 
quality, and risk of the banks, as well as impacts of bank behaviour on the economy as a whole. 
  
Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2003:10) noted that the problem with the HHI as a 
measure of bank competitiveness is its limited applicability to detect monopolies, which is directly 
dependent on a proper definition of a particular market. Choosing a geographic scope to define the 
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market’s extent and size presents huge problems in characterising a particular market. For example 
banks may have a particular market share, each in a specific geographical confine, but they may be 
spread in many other areas of the country where they exercise monopolistic power and thus do not 
compete against each other.  
 
An alternative indicator of the degree of competition is the Lerner Index (LI) which, according to 
Maudos and Guevara (2003:10), is widely used in the specific case of banks. The LI, named after 
economist Abba Lerner, describes a firm's market power. The LI is defined as the difference between 
the price and the marginal cost, divided by the price. The LI can be represented algebraically as 
follows:  
                                  ⁄       (2) 
P is the product market price set by the firm and is equal to the bank’s total revenue (inclusive of 
interest income and other operating income). MC is the firm's marginal cost which reflects the firm’s 
cost of producing additional units of output. The index ranges from 1 to 0, with higher numbers 
implying greater market power. For a perfectly competitive firm, the price must be equal to the 
marginal cost implying that LI = 0. Such firms have no market power. This ratio therefore reflects 
the capacity to set prices above the marginal cost. Considering Maudos and Guevara’s definition of 
the Lerner Index (2003:10), it can be viewed as being equivalent to the negative inverse of the price 
elasticity of demand faced by the bank. In other words, it describes the relationship between 
elasticity and the net interest margins for a profit-maximising bank. 
  
Maudos and Guevara (2003:10) acknowledged that though the Lerner Index appears a better measure 
than the Herfindahl Index, the main problem with it emanates from the fact that the necessary data on 
price and cost information is almost impossible to obtain. 
 
2.2.1.2    The Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis 
The relative market power (RMP) hypothesis states that only those banks with a large market share 
are able to exercise market power in pricing, thus earning higher margins. According to Jeon and 
Miller (2005:13) this hypothesis argues that only large banks with some ‘brand identification’ can 
influence pricing and raise profits by setting wider net interest margins.  
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. 
Relative market power is dependent on the number of competitors represented by market share and 
elasticity of demand (The ministry of Science and Technology, 2005:6).  
 
The developers of the Mont Klein model agree that market power is a function of the market share 
and elasticity of demand, but indicate that market power is also dependent on bank-specific variables 
like bank size, efficiency, bank risk, fee income and bank equity (The ministry of Science and 
Technology, 2005:6). 
   
2.2.2   The Efficient Structure (ES) Paradigm 
The efficient structure (ES) hypothesis was extensively discussed by Berger (1995), Demsetz (1973) 
and Peltzman (1977). It is posited as a competing hypothesis to the SCP alternative. This hypothesis 
emerged as a result of the criticism of the SCP hypothesis’ shortcomings. The efficiency hypothesis 
postulates that a bank’s performance is positively related to its efficiency. Bank efficiency indicators 
are used as a proxy for performance. This means that the difference in net interest margins is 
attributable to differences in operational efficiency across banks (Claeys and Vennet, 2007:6). This is 
to be seen from the fact that market concentration is a result of competition where banks with low-
cost structures are able to increase their profits by marking down prices and growing market share at 
the expense of competitors.  
 
A positive relationship between bank profits and market structure is attributed to the gains made in 
market share by more efficient banks. Molyneux and Forbes’s study in 1995 (cited in Maudos, 
1998:1) indicated that banks that are profitable are profitable because they are more efficient and not 
because of collusive activities, as the traditional SCP would suggest. Al-Muharrami and Matthews 
(2009:5) further explained that banks with superior management and/or production technologies have 
lower costs and therefore higher profits. 
 
The ES theories have been interpreted in two different forms depending on the type of efficiency 
considered (Al-Muharrami & Matthews, 2009:5). These two forms are the X-efficiency and Scale 
efficiency forms. The X-efficiency hypothesis postulates that more efficient banks incur lower costs 
and obtain higher profits and higher market share because they are able to minimise costs at any 
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production level. Alternatively, the Scale efficiency perspective asserts that lower costs, higher 
profits and bigger market share are realised by those banks that produce closer to the minimum 
average cost point. 
 
2.3   Empirical models on net interest margins 
A number of studies, underpinned by the theoretical frameworks discussed, have examined the 
determinants of bank net interest margins and profitability across various markets. Hanweck and Ryu 
(2005:7), in their study to determine the sensitivity of bank net interest margins and profitability to 
credit, interest rate and term structure shocks across bank product specialisation, observed that the 
models’ fundamental assumption is that the NIMs should be maximised for the benefit of the 
shareholders. Almost all models developed by various researchers and authors consider how internal 
factors (a bank’s specific characteristics) and/or external factors (financial industry and economic 
environment) impact on the margins and how to maximise them. The most prominent of the 
empirical models that have been developed over time which form the basis for the study of net 
interest margins are the Firm Theoretic model and the Dealer model. The objective of both models is 
to derive an optimal net interest margin for a bank in a given competitive environment (Hanweck and 
Ryu, 2005:7). 
 
2.3.1   The Firm Theoretic model 
The Firm Theoretic model, also known as ‘cost of goods sold’ model was developed by Klein (1971) 
and Shell (1971). The model viewed the bank in a static setting where demand and supply of deposits 
and loans clear both markets at the same time. The framework was further explored by Zarruck 
(1989) who offered an alternative perspective based on the ‘cost of goods sold’ approach. This 
perspective viewed the bank’s risk as being caused by a random element of deposit supply function. 
Zarruck’s demonstration in 1989 (cited in Saad & Moussawi, 2012:3) indicated that a bank’s interest 
margin has a positive relationship with the amount of equity capital, and a negative one with deposit 
variability.  He also had problems with the initial form of the model as he believed that the analysis 
was originally intended for the trading activities of security dealers, and that it failed to account for 
some relevant aspects of a bank’s operations. The study concluded that when uncertainty increases 
from losses, deposit insurance, and capital regulation, a higher uncertainty of loan losses will have a 
negative effect on interest margins. 
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In 1996 Wong (cited in Santiago & Fernandez, 2003:7) used the Firm Theoretic model developed by 
Klein in 1971 to introduce multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion to the ‘cost of goods 
sold’ approach to investigate the determinants of optimal bank interest margins. He concluded that 
the cost, regulation, credit risk and interest rate risk conditions together determine the optimal bank 
interest margin decision. The interest margin has a linear and positive relationship to the bank’s 
market power, to the average operating costs, and to the degree of credit risk and interest rate risk. 
Wong further demonstrated that the bank’s equity capital has a negative impact on the net interest 
margin when the bank is faced with little interest rate risk. In Wong’s view, the effect of a rising 
inter-bank market rate on the margin is unclear and depends on the net position of the bank in the 
inter-bank market.  
 
Emmanuelle (2003) borrowed from Goyeau, Sauviat and Tarazi’s work in 1999 that applied the Firm 
Theoretic approach in a two-step process to study the Central and Eastern European NIM 
environment. In the original work of Goyeau et al. NIM determinants were divided into two groups: 
the first group contains factors which explain the desired margins under uncertainty and the second 
group of variables was assumed to capture the effects of operating costs, regulation, and the effects 
of active portfolio manipulation. 
 
The Brajas et al. (1999) specification and estimation function on determinants of NIMs in Colombia 
can be categorised under the Firm Theoretic approach. They used the model to document the 
significant effects of financial liberalisation on bank interest margins in Columbia. They concluded 
that the significance of different factors influencing NIMs was affected by liberalisation measures.  
 
2.3.2 The Dealer model 
As evidenced by the number of researchers that have adopted it (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Mcshane 
and Sharpe, 1988; Allen, 1988; Angbazo, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Brock and Saurez, 
2000; Doliente, 2003; Drakos, 2003; Maudos and Guevara, 2003), the most widely used model for 
the study of interest margins and bank profitability appears to be the Dealer model proposed by Ho 
and Saunders in 1981. It is an alternative to the Firm Theoretic approach. This model idealised 
banking businesses’ chief role as intermediation between lenders and borrowers of funds in the credit 
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market. The bank’s business is to provide immediate services for exchange of funds from surplus 
sources to deficit sources. Hanweck and Ryu (2005:7) viewed the Dealer model as being 
underpinned by the same fundamental assumption of bank behaviour: that the net interest margins 
must be maximised for the benefit of shareholders.  
 
According to Ho and Saunders (1981:7), a bank seeks to maximise the wealth of its shareholders by 
selecting an optimal markup on loans and a markdown on deposits. The model considers the bank as 
a risk-averse dealer in the credit market who seeks to derive risk-adjusted returns. Ho and Saunders 
identified the source of banks’ risk as coming from the ‘random walk’ arrival of demands for loans 
and deposits. The bank must therefore borrow and lend to the money market in order to even out its 
loan and deposit mismatches. This means that when a bank receives a deposit before there is a new 
demand for a loan, the bank temporarily invests the money in the money market. In the reverse 
situation, it has to borrow from the money market. During this process the bank assumes the short-
term interest rate, the refinancing and credit risk.  
 
According to Zhou and Wong (2008:42), the model is a one-period decision tool that can be 
represented as follows: 
                       (3) 
                    (4) 
In the equations above,   ,    and    are deposit rate, loan rate and risk-free rate respectively in the 
money market. Both   and   are margins relative to the risk free rate on deposit and loans 
respectively. The absolute sum of the float values is the profit of the bank that is given by:- 
             –               (5) 
In their study, Ho and Saunders (1981) controlled for idiosyncratic factors particular to an individual 
bank and derived a ‘pure’ interest margin common across all banks. They concluded that this pure 
interest margin depends on the degree of managerial risk aversion, the size of bank transactions, the 
banking market competitiveness and interest rate risk. They identified the interest rate risk to which 
the bank is exposed as the most critical factor. 
 
A series of subsequent studies disputed the Dealer model approach, arguing that the model proposed 
by Ho and Saunders in 1981 does not recognise the bank as a firm having a particular production 
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function associated with the provision of banking services (Lerner, 1981:601). As a result of the 
identified limitation of the model, various extensions of the Ho and Saunders original model emerged 
over time. Maudos and Guevara (2003:8) extended the Ho and Saunders’ original model by adding a 
credit premium and operating costs as elements that could explain the variations in the NIM. 
According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:5) and Zhou and Wong (2008:43), a bank’s objective is to 
maximise final wealth at the end of the decision horizon. Initial wealth (Wo) is determined by the 
difference between total assets minus total liabilities. Under this framework assets include loans (Lo) 
and position in the money market (Mo) and deposits (Do) which are viewed as liabilities.  
The initial wealth is therefore given by: 
                           (6) 
The term Io = Lo – Do is the net loan amount (Zhou & Wong 2008:43). Maudos and Guevara 
(2003:5) referred to the net loan amount as the net credit inventory. 
 
Learner (1981:601) extended Ho and Saunders’ (1981) original model to incorporate a firm’s 
production function by also including production costs. Maudos and Guevara (2003:7) assumed these 
costs to be a function of volume of transactions in terms of deposits received C(D) and loans issued 
C(L). The net cost of the transactions amount (CI) is given by C(L)-C(D). Thus, taking into account 
all the foregoing assumptions, the final wealth of the bank over the decision horizon will be given by 
the equation:-  
                                                                  (7) 
Expanding the above mathematical expression and simplifying it results in the following expression-; 
                                  (8) 
C(Io) is the operating cost, which is related to D and L. 
   
         
  
 ,and is the expected return of net loan amount.  
     
  
  
  
  
  
  is the average return of initial wealth,  
     
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
  is the average risk of the net loan amount.  
 
Bank deposits do not generate any risks, which therefore implies that     . 
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It follows that       
  
  
  , where ZL is the credit risk faced by banks. The value ZM denotes the 
interest rate risk caused by interest rate volatility. According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:5), ZL 
and ZM follow a normal distribution as random variables thus ZL~N(0.σL
2), ZM~N(0,σM
2). 
 
Maudos and Guevara (2003:8) realised that there is an interaction between credit risk and interest 
rate risk. Statistically the joint distribution of the two functions is assumed to be bivariate normal 
with a non-null covariance σLM.  
 
The conclusion from the above mathematical analysis is that NIM as a measure of bank profitability 
is a function of the following variables.  
1 Average Operating Costs represented by C(Io) and is dependent on the amounts of loans 
issued L and deposits received D. 
2 Credit risk represented by ZL and affects loan amount Lo issued 
3 Interest rate risk represented by ZM and is applicable to the bank’s money market position 
Mo which is affected by interest rate volatility. 
4 Covariance between credit risk and interest rate risk 
Hanweck and Ryu (2005:7) posited that a bank’s major objective is to maximise the wealth of its 
shareholders. Maudos and Guevara (2003:5) agreed and approximated this wealth of shareholders 
function of the bank using the Taylor expansion series around the expected wealth ̅   
  ̅                         (9) 
Using the Taylor series, which can be differentiated to the second order, the utility of shareholder 
function can be expanded to the following form:- 
           ̅      ̅      ̅  
 
 
     ̅      ̅               (10) 
The utility function is continuously doubly-differentiable, implying that      and      . From  
calculus, it can be understood that    and     bounded range of  greater than 0 and     less than 0 
respectively are the conditions that fulfil the risk-aversion assumption in the decision theory (Centre 
for advanced studies in the Behavioral Sciences, 1997). What this means is that investors, if faced 
with two choices with the same expected value, would prefer the smaller and more certain of the 
options. The assumption of risk aversion implies that risk-averse investors are concerned not only 
about the value of expected losses but also with the possible quantum of those losses.  
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In extending the original model, Maudos and Guevara (2003:6) accepted that when a new deposit is 
made at an interest rate of     and there is no immediate demand for a loan, the bank will, in the short 
term, invest the excess funds in the money market. The return on this investment will add value to 
the final wealth and is given by        . 
 
Substitution of equation 10 into equation eight will result in the following expression: 
   ̅                                                                  (11) 
Given the existence of operating costs in the capture of deposits C(D), Maudos and Guevara (2003:6) 
calculated the increase in expected utility associated with the new deposit. They substituted the new 
value of the final wealth into the utility equation (10) above to come up with the increase in expected 
utility given by:- 
                                                                         (12) 
         
   ̅ [       ]  
 
 
     ̅ [                     
                (13) 
Similarly, a demand for a loan for which there is a cost component C(L) will increase the expected 
utility expressed as follows:- 
                                                                             (14) 
         
   ̅ [       ]  
 
 
     ̅ [                     
            
  
                                                                                                                                                      (15) 
 
According to Hanweck and Ryu (2005:7), the bank’s risk emanates from the random arrival of 
demands for loans and deposits. Maudos and Guevara (2003:6) agreed that the probability of issuing 
a credit or capturing a deposit is a decreasing linear function of the rate spread   or   applied to the 
bank. They represented the statistical probability of capturing a deposit in the following form;- 
                                                        (16) 
The probability of issuing a loan is represented as:- 
                                                                                                                  (17) 
Mathematically, maximising the expected increased utility implies determining the optimal values of 
  and   in the expected Utility function. Optimisation of the loan markup and deposit markdown 
entails calculating the first order derivative of the expected Utility function in equation 10 which 
mathematically can be represented as follows:- 
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                                                                                          (18) 
 
It is assumed that the second order terms and margins and costs of the Taylor’s expansion of 
equations 13 and 15 are negligible (Maudos & Guevara, 2003:6). Ignoring the second order terms the 
first order conditions with respect to   and   are therefore represented as given below:-   
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Optimal interest margin, S, as an algebraic sum of    and   is given by:-  
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            ]  (19)                                                                                                                
  
Equation 19 is the theoretical Dealer model representing the fundamental relationship between NIM 
as the dependent variable and the appropriate independent economic variables (Maudos & Guevara, 
2003:7, Zhou & Wong, 2008:43). From the model the independent variables are identified as:-  
1 Competitive structure of the markets which depends on the elasticity of demand for loans 
and supply of deposits (β)  
2 Average operating costs indicated by C(L) and C(D) 
3 Risk aversion expressed by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 
     ̅ 
    ̅ 
  
4 The volatility of money market interest rates,   
   
5 The credit risk, reflected by,   
      
6 The interaction or covariance between interest rate risk and credit risk,     
7 The size of bank transactions. These are captured by average size of the credit and 
deposits operations, L+D and total volume of credits (L+2Lo) 
 
According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:8), the assumption on which the derivation of S is built on 
provides a mathematical expression of what is termed the ‘pure’ net interest margin. However these 
researchers recognised that in practice the concept of a pure margin is a myth. This is mainly because 
the application of the model must entail recognition of the practical effects of certain market, 
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regulatory and institutional imperfections that distort the observed pure net interest margin. Ho and 
Saunders (1981) acknowledged that in practice these imperfections exist and must be viewed as other 
variables that can influence net interest margins. In addition, these variables potentially distort the 
pure margin and are difficult to incorporate into the Dealer model.  
 
Different empirical studies proposed different sets of variables that they considered representative of 
the imperfections. Ho and Saunders (1981:589) regarded implicit interest payments, loan loss, and 
bank capital as the institutional imperfections that may impact on pure net interest margins. Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000:258) identified implicit interest payments, bank capital and opportunity cost 
of reserves as the relevant imperfections, while Brock and Saurez (2000:142) attributed 
imperfections to operating expenses, loan loss, bank capital and liquid assets. Drakos (2003:8) 
considered important imperfections that affect the pure interest margin as liquidity, loan loss 
provision and interest rate risk. Zhou and Wong (2008:44) identified implicit interest and the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves as the significant market imperfections affecting NIMs in 
mainland China. Maudos and Guevara (2003:8) concurred with Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000:258) that important variables that contribute to imperfections are the payment of implicit 
interest and opportunity cost of keeping reserves. They also agreed with Angbazo (1997:58) that 
quality of management plays a part in distorting pure margin, as good management is able to choose 
highly profitable assets and low-cost liabilities. 
 
To control for these factors Ho and Saunders (1981:589), Saunders and Schumacher (2000:258) and 
Brock and Saurez (2000:142) suggested the use of a two-step regression function. This method was a 
radical departure from the normal single-step specification that was widely used by many other 
researchers including McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo (1997). The single-step regression 
specification combines in one function the base variables of the theoretical model and the additional 
variables representing imperfections that reflect other aspects not incorporated in the modeling of the 
pure margin.  
 
The compelling case for the use of a two-step regression function was well explained by Doliente 
(2003:4), who represented the regression specification as follows:- 
         ⁄  
 
 
                                                                             (20) 
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S, is the net interest margin, while the second term in the right side of the equation is a first order 
risk-adjustment term that depends on three factors: the bank management’s coefficient of risk-
aversion (R), the size of the bank transactions (Q) and the instantaneous variance of the interest rate 
on deposits and loans (σ2) (Doliente, 2003:4). 
 
Doliente explained that the advantage of the two-step model is that it allows a ‘pure’ margin to be 
estimated. The term   ⁄  is the ratio of the intercept and the slope of the symmetric deposit and loan 
arrival functions of the bank. Doliente (2003:4) looked at the intercept as a measure of the bank’s 
risk-neutral margin. In other words, this ratio provides some measure of the effect of market structure 
in the determination of the margin because if a bank can exert some market power in the loan 
demand and deposit supply functions as expressed by a high   ⁄  ratio, then it may exercise 
monopoly power.  
 
Doliente (2003:5) considered the first step of the regression as addressing the hypothesis that the 
observed net interest margin will comprise the pure margin that is constant across banks. In the first 
stage the effect of the explanatory variables of the interest margin not explicitly introduced into the 
theoretical model is controlled (Maudos & Guevara, 2008:9). The estimated intercept is the pure 
margin and is treated as a dependent variable in the second regression for the estimation of the 
effects of market structure (α/β) and interest rate volatility σ2. The original model by Ho and 
Saunders (1981) considered the effects of risk aversion (R) and size of bank transactions (Q) to not 
change as fast as the interest rates, and it therefore could be ignored in the equation.   
 
The advantage of the two-step approach is that it allows a pure interest margin to be estimated. 
However, the biggest disadvantage of the approach is that the model requires a time series long 
enough to be able to estimate the pure margin (Maudos & Guevara, 2003:9). 
 
Many more studies were inspired by the limitations of the original Ho and Saunders (1981) model to 
develop their own extensions and modifications to the original model. The result was a proliferation 
of different versions of the original model, but all with the same theoretical assumptions as the Ho 
and Saunders model.  
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Allen (1988:232) extended the original model to allow for the existence of heterogeneous credits and 
deposits. He concluded that a bank that diversifies its product portfolio is able to competitively 
reduce its pure interest spreads. Likewise, and unlike in the original Ho and Saunders (1981) model, 
which identified the source of risk as the random arrival of deposits and loans, McShane and Sharpe 
(1985: 118) reckoned that interest rate risk comes from the uncertainty of the money markets in that 
the money market rates cannot be predicted. 
 
Angbazo (1997:60) modified the original Ho and Saunders (1981) model by extending it to 
incorporate credit risk into the basic model. He argued that the interest margins of commercial banks 
reflect both the interest and credit risk premiums, and that banks of different sizes are sensitive to 
different types of risk. 
 
According to Hanweck and Ryu (2005:10), both the Dealer and the Firm Theoretic models have two 
main limitations. The first limitation is that both models are single-horizon or short-run and static, 
assuming homogeneous assets and liabilities with the same reference rate. But, in fact, bank 
portfolios are not uniform and have different security, maturity and re-pricing structures that usually 
go beyond a single horizon. Decisions in one period will affect net interest margins in the subsequent 
period.  
 
The second limitation, according to Hanweck and Ryu (2005:10), is that in the models the banking 
industry is treated as being mainly homogeneous. In practice, different banks have different product 
ranges, business models, pricing power and funding structures. These bank characteristics affect net 
interest margin sensitivity in different ways.  
  
 
 
2.4   Some empirical studies on net interest margins 
This section reviews some available studies on NIMs across various markets. The study of NIMs has 
tended to be either single or multiple-country based, depending on the objectives of the study. A 
single-country study’s main objective is to determine country-specific NIM determinants as they 
affect the local industry within one country. A multi-country study, on the other hand, aims mainly to 
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determine NIM drivers across countries. Comparisons between countries are most relevant in 
instances where those countries share common economic denominators such as sharing of common 
economic and/or geographical influences. Examples of such influences include membership of 
countries to common trading blocs, common markets, customs and monetary unions. The EU is a 
typical example of countries bound together in a monetary union based on the euro currency.  
 
For the purposes of this study criteria for comparisons will be set out by categorisation of markets 
into developed or developing markets, geographical location in terms of where the market is situated, 
for example in Africa, Asia or Europe, and economic groupings such as the EU and BRICS.  
 
2.4.1 Empirical studies for the developed markets  
Western Europe and the United States of America (USA) are considered as benchmarks in financial 
markets by virtue of the advanced level of their financial development. NIM structures in these 
markets provide the basis for analysis and comparison of NIM environments and structures 
elsewhere (Doliente, 2003:1). 
 
2.4.1.1   Single-country studies for United States of America and Western Europe 
Berger (1995) used the Granger Causality model in his study of bank performance of USA banks. He 
managed to document empirical evidence that indicated that return on equity (ROE) and capital to 
asset ratio are positively related. 
 
According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:10), Europe is unique in that it can be classified either as a 
single or multiple-country study area, depending on the perspective of the researcher. However, 
many studies in Europe have tended to group all the principal European countries together under the 
European Union banner that qualifies it as a single country. This is so because the European Union 
operates through a hybrid system of supranational independent institutions. It has developed a single 
market through a standardised system of laws which apply in all member states. The Union 
maintains common policies on trade. It is probably due to this reason that most of the studies on 
European countries are grouped together and therefore can be considered as single-country studies.  
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On the other hand Maudos and Guevara (2003:10) noted that the European Union economic 
character is not entirely homogeneous across all the member states. In this respect different countries 
are bound to be affected and influenced by different economic elements. For this reason the EU can 
still fall into the multiple-country study category. This latter categorisation has been adopted in this 
study for analysis of Europe NIM structures. 
 
2.4.1.2   Multiple-country studies for Western Europe and the United States of America 
Notable multiple-country studies in Western Europe and the USA were conducted by Angbazo 
(1997), Demerguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and 
Guevara (2003), Mendes and Abreu (2007) and Emmanuelle (2003). 
  
Angbazo (1997:66) used the modified Dealer model in a single-step approach to study data for 
different size classes of banks in Europe and the USA for the period between 1989 and 1993. He 
came to the conclusion that the interest margins of commercial banks reflect both the interest rate and 
credit risk premiums, and that banks of different sizes are sensitive to different types of risk. He 
observed that banks with assets greater than $1 billion are sensitive to credit risk but not to interest 
rate risk. In addition, he concluded that the NIMs of regional banks are sensitive to interest rate risk 
but not to credit risk. Angbazo also discovered that off-balance sheet items have a measurable effect 
on interest margins for all banks except regional ones. Off-balance sheet items that Angbazo 
analysed included options, swaps and net acceptances acquired, net securities lent, letters of credit 
and loan commitments. He also concluded that the degree of statistical significance of these factors 
varied greatly. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) conducted a multiple-country study to examine the 
determinants of bank interest margins and profitability using bank-level data for 80 countries across 
the world for the period 1988 to 1995. They controlled for differences in bank activities, leverage and 
macroeconomic environment. The results of their study indicated that bank-specific variables, 
macroeconomic variables, taxation, regulations, financial structure and legal indicators are 
significant factors that influence NIMs. Their results also showed that banks in countries with a more 
competitive banking sector have smaller margins and are less profitable. Bank concentration tended 
to affect bank profitability; larger banks tended to have higher margins.  
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Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998:3) also concluded that banks with higher assets to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) ratios are associated with lower margins and profits. On the other hand, 
well capitalised banks have higher net interest margins and are more profitable, probably because of 
the lower cost of funding associated with lower prospective bankruptcy costs. In addition they also 
found that foreign banks have higher profitability and margins than domestic banks in developing 
countries, while the opposite is true for developed countries.  
 
Another finding of the study by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998:4) was that a bank’s activity 
mix affects their net interest margin and their profitability. They deduced that those banks with 
relatively high non-interest earning assets are less profitable than banks that largely depend on 
deposits for their funding. 
 
Another conclusion of the Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998:4) study was that net interest margins 
variations are sensitive to macroeconomic factors for both the developed and the developing markets. 
Inflation was singled out as having a positive relationship with net interest margins and profitability. 
Inflation was found to increase net interest margins as a result of higher costs from increased 
numbers of transactions, and more income derived from bank floats. Bank income increases more 
with inflation than do bank costs. 
 
In a related study later in 2001 (cited in Naceur & Goaied, 2001:5), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
demonstrated that financial development and bank structure have considerable effect on bank 
margins and profitability. They provided evidence that suggested that higher bank development is 
associated with lower performance. They also found that stock market development leads to higher 
margins and profitability, especially for banks which are at a lower level of development. The results 
indicated the complementarities between bank and stock market.  
 
The other findings from Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga’s study in 2001 were that:  
 Bank-specific characteristics explain a considerable amount of the within-country variation in 
intermediary costs. 
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 Bank regulation helps explain why the cost of financial intermediation, prudential regulation 
on bank entry and restriction on bank activities and freedom impact favourably on net interest 
margins. 
 Relationship between concentration and net interest margin is mixed. 
 Macroeconomic setting and stock market development have positive impact on profitability. 
 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000:253) applied the two-step approach to the original Dealer model in 
a different setting by adopting a multi-country approach across a number of European countries and 
the USA. They used data from 614 banks for the period 1988 to 1995. They concluded that interest 
rate volatility, bank capitalisation, bank market structure and regulatory requirements are the 
significant factors that affected bank interest margins across the countries under study. 
 
Maudos and Guevara (2003) studied NIMs in the principal European banking sectors comprising 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain for the period 1993 to 2000. They adopted 
the Dealer model single-step regression approach but widened it to account for the banks’ explicit 
operating costs.  Their conclusion was that market concentration, interest rate volatility, credit risk, 
and operating costs are the significant factors in this market (Maudos & Guevara, 2003:18-19). 
 
Mendes and Abreu (2007:1) studied the determinants of NIMs in Portugal, Spain, France and 
Germany. Their objective was to evaluate whether the European countries sharing a common bond 
through the European Monetary Union also share the same interest margin and profitability 
determinants. Apart from the usual microeconomic variables, Mendes and Abreu also examined 
whether bank size and capitalisation, in addition to the macroeconomic variables of inflation, 
economic growth, exchange rate policy and financial liberalisation, has any material impact on NIMs 
in the countries under study. Using the Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) regression specification, 
Mendes and Abreu (2007:11) concluded that NIM determinants are not the same in the countries 
studied. They found that operating costs, bank capitalisation, inflation and risk aversion were 
significant factors in explaining NIMs. On the other hand, market share, GDP and exchange rates 
had nominal impact on NIMs.  
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Emmanuelle (2003:4) adopted both the Firm Theoretic and Dealer models in a single-step regression 
specification to study the determinants of bank interest rates for twelve selected European countries 
during the period 1989 to 1999. The theoretical premise of their study was that optimal bank interest 
margins tend to be larger for banks that are more risk-averse than risk neutral, and that a bank’s 
market power increases the optimal interest margin.  This means that there is a positive correlation 
between interest margins and market power, operating costs, interest rate risk and credit risk. The 
empirical results from Emmanuelle (2003:13) study largely corroborated the usual theoretical 
findings that operating costs, interest rates, capital requirements, credit risk and opportunity costs are 
significant variables. 
 
2.4.2  Empirical studies for developing markets  
The markets in Latin America, Asia, Africa, East and Central Europe have not yet been developed to 
the levels of those in Western Europe and America. These markets form the developing market 
category for the purposes of this literature review. 
 
2.4.2.1    Single-country studies for Central and Eastern Europe  
The most notable single-country study for Central and Eastern Europe was conducted by Zuzana and 
Tigran in 2008. They analysed bank interest margin determinants in Russia from 1999 to 2007. They 
used the single-step regression analysis approach for their study (Zuzana & Tigran, 2008:8-9). The 
emphasis of the study was to determine whether bank ownership structures matter in determining 
NIM levels in Russia. The Zuzana and Tigran (2008:16) study provided two important conclusions:- 
1) the impact of the commonly used determinants such as credit risk profile, size of operation and 
bank risk aversion vary across state-controlled, domestic, private and foreign-owned banks and 2) 
that the influence of market concentration, liquidity and operational cost is homogeneous across 
ownership groups. 
 
2.4.2.2    Multiple-country studies for Central and Eastern Europe  
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006:3) studied profitability of banks in the Central and Eastern European 
countries of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, for the period 
of 1995 to 2003. The focus of the study was to determine whether foreign ownership of banks was a 
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factor influencing bank margins. They used the LOGIT econometric specification model, pioneered 
by Joseph Berkson in 1994, for their study. The LOGIT regression is used for prediction of 
probability of occurrence of an event by fitting data to a logistic curve. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk 
(2006:10) explained that the LOGIT regression is a generalised linear model used mainly for 
binomial regression. Like many forms of regression analysis, it makes use of several predictor 
variables which can be either numerical or categorical. 
 
The results of the Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006:14) study showed that foreign banks earn higher 
margins, especially so if they are start-up institutions.  According to their study, takeover banks 
achieve relatively low profitability, probably because some countries allow takeovers only after 
crises. 
 
Claeys and Vennet (2007:2) also investigated the determinants of bank interest margins in the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). The study aimed to establish the extent to which 
the relatively high interest margins in CEEC could be attributed to low efficiency or non-competitive 
market conditions. Their objective was to determine whether there was financial convergence 
between the CEEC banks and the Western European banks. This was important in view of the re-
configuration of financial systems in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of centrally 
planned systems in the CEEC, which existed during the Soviet Union era. The CEEC transition 
economies had to reconfigure their financial systems to facilitate admission to the EU or realignment 
to the EU for those countries that had already joined (Claeys & Vennet, 2007:3).  
 
Claeys and Vennet (2007:3) also set out to establish whether the presence of foreign-owned and 
state-owned banks influenced the difference in margins between the two regions. Their study adopted 
a single-step regression model and controlled for bank-specific characteristics such as capital 
adequacy, demand and savings ratio, loan to total asset ratio and country-specific macroeconomic 
conditions. The results of Claeys and Vennet’s (2007:22) study indicated that capital adequacy, bank 
size, regulatory requirements and the business cycle (inflation and interest rates) have varying 
impacts on bank NIMs across CEEC and Western Europe. 
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2.4.2.3   Single-country studies for Latin America  
Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (2000) investigated and documented the major effects of financial 
liberalisation on the interest margins of Colombian banks. The results of the study indicated that, 
although the overall interest margin has not reduced with the financial liberalisation measures 
undertaken in the 1990s, relevance of the different factors that drive bank net interest margins were 
affected by the liberation measures (Barajas et al, 2000:188). They used panel data estimations to 
show that financial liberalisation in general had a beneficial impact on bank behaviour in Colombia 
by increasing competition, lowering intermediation costs and improving loan quality. Barajas et al. 
however, warned that the foreign and domestic entry of banks, beginning in 1990, despite having 
improved bank behaviour by enhancing operative efficiency and competition, may have resulted in 
increased risk and a subsequent deterioration in loan quality, particularly among domestic banks 
(Barajas et al, 2000:190). 
 
Afanasieff, Lhacer and Nakane (2002:17) used the panel data technique in a two-step approach 
pioneered by Ho and Saunders in 1981 to ascertain the main determinants of interest margins in 
Brazil. The starting point for the study was the identification that the Brazilian banking system has 
traditionally been characterised by high lending rates and low levels of deposit rates as a ratio of the 
gross domestic product (GDP). The major objective of the study was to establish whether macro or 
microeconomic factors are the most relevant factors influencing the behaviour of NIMs in Brazil. 
This followed the stabilisation of the macroeconomic environment leading to anticipation that the 
banks’ interest margins would fall and thus balance the credit market. The results of their study 
suggested that macroeconomic variables are the most significant factors impacting on interest 
margins in Brazil (Afanasieff et al, 2002:17).  
 
2.4.2.4    Multiple-country studies for Latin America  
Brock and Saurez (2000:113) studied the five Latin American countries of Argentina, Colombia, 
Bolivia, Chile and Peru for the period 1991 to 1996 using the two-step regression Dealer model 
framework. The results of the study did not conform to the benchmark results of Western Europe and 
the United States. Instead, the results revealed that interest margins for Latin America are influenced 
by liquidity and capital risk at bank level, and by interest rate volatility, inflation and GDP growth at 
macroeconomic level. They claimed that the disparities may be attributable to distortions caused by 
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inadequate regulatory systems that allow weak banks to continue to exist and operate, unreliable 
financial reporting practices that result in misstated bank capital, and extensive government 
guarantees that encourage excessive risk-taking among banks (Brock & Saurez, 2000:128-129).  
 
Another study of the determinants of NIMs in Latin American banks was conducted by Chortareas, 
Garza-Garcia and Girardone (2011). The objective of the study was to consider the determinants of 
NIMs, focusing on the relationship between structural and non-structural measures of competition, 
and non-parametric estimates of efficiency (Chortareas et al., 2011:2). The study was therefore based 
on the SCP theoretical framework. The authors used a single-step dynamic panel regression model 
for a sample of 2300 bank observations from 1999 to 2006. 
 
The Chortareas et al. (2011:21) study proved that market share and bank concentration do not impact 
on NIMs in Latin America. On the contrary, the market structure has an influence on the interest 
rates. The results also agreed with those of Afanasieff et al. (2002:18), that macroeconomic variables 
are the most significant factors for Latin American banks.  
 
Gelos (2006) investigated NIMs in fourteen Latin American countries. He considered bank size, 
equity, overhead costs and foreign ownership as the independent variables for the modeling of NIMs. 
The Gelos (2006:23) study concluded that low efficiency, high reserve requirements, legal 
framework and market interest rates are the factors that influence NIMs in Latin America. Gelos also 
concurred with other researchers on Latin America in the conclusion that macroeconomic factors 
play a big part in influencing NIMs in the region. 
 
2.4.2.5    Single-country studies for Asia  
Guru, Staunton and Balashanmugam (2002:3) attempted to identify the determinants of successful 
deposit banks in Malaysia. The study was based on a sample of seventeen (17) Malaysian 
commercial banks for the period between 1986 and 1995. They divided the profitability determinants 
into two categories: the internal (liquidity, capital adequacy, and expenses management) and external 
determinants (ownership, bank size and economic conditions). The results of the study indicated that 
efficient expenses management was the most significant in explaining high bank profitability. 
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Inflation was found to have a positive effect on bank performance, whereas high interest rates lead to 
low bank profitability (Guru et al., 2002:13). 
 
Zhou and Wong (2008:42) used the single-step Dealer model regression approach to empirically 
study the determinants of net interest margins for Chinese commercial banks from 1996 to 2003. The 
results of the study showed that market competition, average operating costs, degree of risk aversion, 
transaction size, implicit interest payments, opportunity cost of reserves and management efficiency 
are significant factors that determine NIMs in mainland China (Zhou & Wong, 2008:50). 
 
Vong and Chan (2009:93) examined the impact of bank characteristics as well as macroeconomic 
and financial structure variables on the performance of the banking industry in Macao. Macao, 
together with Hong Kong is a special administrative region of The People’s Republic of China. 
These researchers used a cross-sectional classical linear regression functional form to determine the 
relevant factors. They concluded that bank capitalisation, loan loss provisions and inflation exhibit a 
significant relationship to bank performance (Vong & Cheng, 2009:108-109).  
 
2.4.2.6    Multiple-country studies for Asia  
Doliente (2003:2) investigated the drivers of net interest margins for banks in four South-East Asian 
countries: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. She was a strong proponent of the two- 
step regression approach of the Dealer model. The conclusions drawn from the results were that 
bank-specific factors such as operating expenses, capital loan quality, collateral and liquid assets are 
critical. The second regression revealed that NIMs are driven by the non-competitive structure of the 
region’s banking market (Doliente, 2003:14-16). 
 
Naceur and Omran (2008:4) used a sample of 173 banks from a set of 10 Middle East and North 
African (MENA) countries (Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, the Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) to examine the influence of bank regulation, 
concentration, and financial and institutional development on commercial bank margins and 
profitability for the period 1985 to 2005. The researchers used a single-step unbalanced panel 
regression model in which they controlled for institutional and macroeconomic factors. The 
empirical results showed that bank-specific characteristics such as bank capitalisation and credit risk 
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have a positive and significant impact on banks’ NIMs. Other than inflation, macroeconomic 
variables and financial development were found not to have significant impact on a bank’s NIM, 
profitability and costs (Naceur & Omran, 2008:18-19).  
  
2.4.2.7    Single-country studies for Africa 
Research on developing countries especially Sub-Saharan Africa is a recent phenomenon. Chen 
(2009:3) believes that studies on Sub-Saharan African banks are relatively few due to a variety of 
factors that include low levels of financial development, small numbers of banks, limited market 
activities and absence of quality data. 
 
2.4.2.8   Empirical studies for South Africa 
South Africa has a well-developed and regulated banking system that compares favourably with 
developed countries (Banking Association of South Africa, 2010).  
 
As per the Banking Association of South Africa, the South African market is currently made up of 19 
registered banks, two mutual banks, 13 local branches of foreign banks and 43 banks with approved 
local representative offices. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is at the apex of the banking 
sector. Its mandate is to exercise ‘lender of last resort’ duties and to implement the bank’s 
accommodation policy through direct and/or indirect intervention. Direct intervention is through 
interest rates controls, credit ceilings and direct lending designed to set or limit either interest rates or 
amounts of credit outstanding. 
 
During 2001 the SARB introduced a new repo rate (Repurchase Rate) policy. The repo rate is the 
interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow money from the reserve bank (SARB, 2012). In 
order to make a profit, the banks then lend out money to their own clients at a higher rate known as 
the prime rate. According to SARB (2012) repo rates changes affect the prime rate. The prime rate in 
turn affects the interest rate banks charge on the market. NIM is the difference between the interest 
rates at which banks borrow and those at which they lend. Repo rate movements may affect NIM if 
rates on deposits do not move proportionately.  
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The new repo rate policy introduced by the SARB in 2001 had the effect of widening the spread 
between repo and prime rate to 350 basis points (Banking Association of South Africa, 2010).  
 
At face value it would appear that the NIMs in South Africa would be uniform across banks because 
of the reference to the 350 basis points between repo and prime rate. On close examination however, 
it can be noted that the prime rate is not an indicator of the lending rate and the repo rate, but a 
benchmark from which to price loans, deposits and advances. This provides the study with scope to 
investigate the bank-specific determinants of NIMs considering that the rates are not the same when 
measured from the same prime rate reference.  
 
A rigorous attempt to study NIMs in South Africa was made by KPMG (1998:1). The study was 
commissioned by the SARB as a response to a wave of criticism due to the level of profitability of 
the local banking industry in the face of high interest rates. There was concern that the high interest 
rates were threatening to push the economy into a recession.  
 
KPMG’s terms of reference were to review the profitability of banks in South Africa and make 
comparisons with other markets and establish whether or not the banks were making excessive 
profits. The approach therefore was to estimate the minimum returns expected by shareholders and 
compare these with the actual profits of certain identified banks.  
 
The KPMG study does not fit a definition of scientific research as it did not concern itself with a 
scientific approach rooted in theoretical foundation. According to Zikmund (2003:235), a scient ific 
observation serves a formulated research purpose, is planned and recorded systematically, and is 
related to general propositions rather than being presented as reflecting a set of interesting curiosities. 
Scientific research is also subject to checks or controls on validity and reliability. The premise of 
scientific research is analysis and interpretation of empirical evidence, establishing relationships, 
testing theories and making predictions. In contrast, the KPMG study did not meet the above criteria 
but was rather an assessment of a curiosity on levels of bank profitability in South Africa. The 
KPMG report (1998:37) used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to determine the required 
rates of return. The CAPM specifies the relationship between risk and required rates of return for 
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well diversified portfolios. The conclusion of the report was that South African banks were not 
achieving excessive returns but that the returns are close to the minimum required by the CAPM. 
 
Despite the KPMG report not being a formal scientific research, it is however a good source of 
insight into the possible elements affecting NIMs in the South African banking industry. The KPMG 
report (1998:4) identified some factors, based on common literature, that were anticipated to impact 
on NIMs in South Africa. The variables, as identified in the report, are as follow:- 
 Risk aversion 
 Credit risk 
 Interest rate volatility 
 Operating costs 
 Liquidity 
 Bank capital 
 Loan loss provision  
 Non-funded income (Non-interest bearing income) 
 Regulatory environment. 
These factors, considered together with those given in the theoretical Dealer model, are useful as a 
pool from which to start the iterative process of choosing the significant factors affecting NIMs in 
South Africa. 
 
2.4.2.9   Other single-country studies for Africa 
Recent NIM studies on Africa include Tunisia. Tunisia has been well studied and documented. The 
Ben-Khediri, Casu and Sheik-Rahim study in 2005 (cited in Naceur & Goaied, 2008:4) employed 
both parametric and non-parametric tests and panel analysis to investigate the determinants of 
interest margins and profitability in Tunisia. The study concluded that the more profitable banks are 
those that have lower operating costs, greater size of operations and higher leverage ratios. In 
addition the study further revealed that bank-specific variables and regulatory changes are the most 
relevant factors in explaining the Tunisian banks’ interest differentials.  Macroeconomic variables 
were not found to influence the banks’ margins. 
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Naceur and Goaied (2001:2) carried out a single-country study for Tunisia to investigate the 
determinants for banks’ performances during the period 1980 to 2000. They found that the best 
performing banks are those that have struggled to improve labour and capital productivity, 
maintained a high level of deposit accounts relative to their assets, and those that have been able to 
reinforce their equity. They also concluded that high net interest margins and profitability tended to 
be associated with banks that hold a relatively high amount of capital and have large overheads. The 
size of bank was found to impact negatively on net interest margins and profitability. In addition, 
Naceur and Goaied (2001: 18) found that stock market development has a positive impact on a 
Tunisian bank’s profitability.  
 
The Naceur and Goaied (2001:4) study concluded that macroeconomic variables have no impact on 
Tunisian banks’ profitability. Other findings from the study are that:- 
1 The disintermediation of the Tunisian financial system is favourable to the banks’ 
profitability. 
2 Private banks tend to perform better than public banks. 
3 Interest rate liberalisation has an inverse effect on net interest margins. 
 
2.4.2.10     Multiple-country studies for Africa 
Al-Hasschini, in his study in 2007 (cited in Flamini et al. 2009:9), used accounting decompositions 
and panel regression techniques to study the determinants of bank net interest margins in 10 Sub-
Saharan African countries. He concluded that credit risk and market power (inefficiencies) are 
critical factors in explaining most of the variations in net interest margins across the region. The 
study suggested that macroeconomic risk has only limited effects on net interest margins.  
 
Al-Hasschini’s findings that macroeconomic risk does not have a major impact on net interest 
margins in Sub-Saharan Africa is in sharp contrast to other studies on Sub-Saharan Africa. In a 
recent study (Flamini et al. 2009:11) used a two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) approach 
to analyse 389 banks in 41 Sub-Saharan African countries to investigate the determinants of NIMs. 
The results of the study suggested that bank interest margins are affected by macroeconomic 
variables. Particularly, inflation was found to have a positive effect on bank margins. In addition, 
idiosyncratic factors such as credit risk, risk aversion, structure of the market and size of operations 
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were found to be significant factors that influence net interest margins, while bank concentration did 
not have a direct effect on margins for Sub-Saharan banks. 
  
2.5  Review of study methodology 
The literature revealed that there are two most common estimation techniques for the analysis of the 
NIM data: the simple Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) using the Ordinary Least Squares 
Method (OLS), and the Panel Regression method. Brooks (2008:10) indicated that empirical 
specifications of the Dealer model form can be analysed either by cross-sectional analysis using the 
OLS or by the Panel estimation method. He suggested however that it is often impractical to estimate 
a robust model for the first time. The process of building the model is iterative and the resultant 
preferred model is often very different from the original proposed model.  
 
Cross-sectional data, according to Brooks (2008:5) are data collected at a single point in time as 
compared to panel data which has the dimensions of both time and of cross-section. Cross-section 
analysis is static and is only concerned with the relationship between variables, irrespective of time 
variations. Brooks (2008:153) further advised that static models allow for only a contemporaneous 
relationship between variables, so that a change in one or more of the explanatory variables at a 
given time causes an instant change in the dependent variable at the same given time. However, in 
real terms, the current value of the dependent variable can depend on previous values of both the 
dependent and explanatory variables.  
 
Studies on net interest margins that adopted the simple CLRM using the OLS data estimating 
technique include those by Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Brock and Saurez 
(2000), Guru et al. (2002), Doliente (2003), Maudos and Guevara (2003), Emmanuelle (2003), Zhou 
and Wong (2008),  Zuzana  and Tigran (2008). 
 
Panel estimation techniques seem to be gaining popular use of late. A large number of researchers 
including Barajas et al. (1999), Naceur & Goaied (2001), Afanasieff et al. (2002), Havrylchk & 
Hurzyk (2006), Mendes and Abreu (2007), Al-Haschini (2007), Claeys and Vennet (2007), Naceur 
and Omran (2008) and Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone (2011) adopted the panel estimation 
method.  The panel data technique has the dimension of both time and cross-section. It entails 
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measuring the variations on the same entities over time (Brooks, 2008:5). This means that the data is 
cross-sectional, but that the cross-section is observed over time. The model is then said to be 
dynamic.  In the panel data technique, the regression equation derived from the Dealer model will be 
represented in the following form;- 
                                                                                                               (21) 
where indices i and t stand for bank and quarter (time) respectively, NIMit stands for the net interest 
margin for bank i in period t,  αi is the intercept and εit is the error term. DETit is a vector that 
contains the determinants of bank net interest margins as informed by the Dealer model.  
 
Brooks (2008:5) further suggested that the panel estimation technique is superior to OLS because it 
can address a wider range of issues and more complex problems than would be possible with pure 
time series or pure cross-sectional data. In the case of purely cross-sectional data, regressions usually 
suffer from the problem of heteroscedasticity, which is a situation where the errors do not have a 
constant variance. Heteroscedasticity is represented statistically as follows:- 
Va r(εt) ≠ σ
2                                                          (22) 
According to Brooks (2008:5) cross-sectional data is really only true for a moment in time. There is 
therefore always doubt on whether it can adequately represent the unchanging characteristic being 
researched. Zikmund (2003:187-188) agreed and added that the dynamic changes in the relationship 
between variables can be examined by the panel technique which would otherwise need a very long 
time series to establish, and which is clearly difficult to observe with purely cross-sectional data. In 
Brooks (2008:488-489) opinion, another positive about panel data is the increase in the number of 
degrees of freedom. This means that if there are n units of observation and the survey is carried out in 
T time periods there are potentially nT observations consisting of time series of length T on n parallel 
units.  
 
Brooks (2008:488-489) also observed that combining cross-sectional and time series data can also 
help in mitigating problems of multicollinearity that appear in time series if they are modeled 
individually. It can also remove the effect of omitted variable bias in the regression results.  
 
In advocating the use of the panel estimation technique for analysis of bank NIM determinants, 
Zuzana and Tigran (2008:8-9) claimed that panel estimation is superior to OLS due to its ability to 
 
 
42 
 
capture the heterogeneity of individual banks. Swany et al. in 1996 (cited in Mendes & Abreu, 
2007:2) claimed that the relationship between NIMs and the explanatory variables is not linear and is 
not stable in a cross-section analysis. Naceur and Omran (2008:13) also viewed purely empirical 
cross-sectional work on bank NIM determinants as prone to suffer from two sources of analytical 
inconsistencies, namely, omitted variables and endogeneity problems. Endogeneity arises when there 
is a correlation between the parameter or variable and the error term. Naceur and Omran (2008:13) 
claimed that this can arise from, among other things, measurement error, auto-correlated errors, 
omitted variables or sample selection error. The statistical impact of endogeneity on Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) data analysis is that the regression coefficient may be biased. However, Naceur and 
Omran (2008:13) noted that if one was to use the OLS regression, problems of endogeneity can be 
mitigated by employing some advanced statistical methods such as the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM), Instrumental Variable Regression (IVR) and the Heckman Selection Correction 
(HSC). These methods are, however, too advanced and difficult to manipulate and therefore are not 
amenable for daily use.  
 
Given the Naceur and Omran (2008:13) and Zuzana and Tigran (2008:8-9) arguments, it would 
appear that the most suitable analysis technique for NIM is the panel data estimation technique. 
However, Brooks (2008:5) cautioned that the panel data technique must be used with great care. He 
pointed out that, because panel data has cross-section and time series dimensions, the application of 
regression models to fit econometric models is more complex than simple cross-section data sets. 
The panel data technique is only becoming more popular due to the widespread use of complex 
computer software which facilitates the organisation and production of such data.  
 
In any case, a true panel data set has to be balanced (Brooks, 2008:5). A balanced panel data set as 
opposed to an unbalanced panel has the same number of time series observations for each cross-
sectional entity. Such data is almost impossible to obtain.  Furthermore, in the case where one is to 
use an unbalanced panel, it must then be recognised that there is a big possibility that the causes of 
missing observations may be endogenous to the model. Brooks (2008:5) further advised that if a 
balanced panel was created artificially by eliminating all units of observation with missing 
observations, the resulting data set may not be representative of the population, as was intended. In 
addition, if a balanced panel is assumed, and it has got missing observations, the software used must 
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be able to account for these discrepancies. Such software is not normally readily available and if it 
can be found is often prohibitively expensive. 
 
Another problem according to Brooks (2008:490-498) is that there are also various approaches to the 
fitting of models using panel data, namely the Fixed Effects Models (FEM) and Random Effects 
Models (REM). Each of these models also has various versions which the researcher must well 
understand before attempting to use them. Brooks defined the FEM as allowing the intercept in the 
regression model to differ cross-sectionally but not over time, while all the slope estimates are fixed 
both cross-sectionally and over time.  
 
In the FEM, the error term εit is decomposed into an individual specific effect μi and the remainder 
disturbance term νit that varies over time and entities. According to Brooks (2008:491), the 
component μi can be thought of as capturing all the latent variables that affect NIMit but do not vary 
over time. The net interest margin specification model, minus the seasonal dummy variable can then 
be re-written as follows-; 
                                                                                                              (23) 
 
FEM models can be either Time-Fixed Effects models (TFEM) or Entity Fixed Effects (EFEM) 
models. The TFEM assumes that the average value of the independent variable NIMit changes over 
time but not cross-sectionally. Similarly, the EFEM assumes that the average value of NIMit changes 
cross-sectionally but is fixed over time. All these parameters that must be considered add to the 
complexity and difficult of using panel regression techniques. 
 
2.6   Conclusion 
There is an extensive body of literature, especially in the developed world, that seeks to identify the 
significant factors that influence bank net interest margins. While some studies concentrate on the 
understanding of bank profitability in a particular country, others concentrate on a panel of countries. 
As a result, studies on NIMs are generally categorised as either single- or multiple-country based. 
The champions of multiple-country studies included Angbazo (1997) for USA and Europe, 
Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) for 80 countries, both developed and developing, Claeys and 
Vennet (2007) for Western and Eastern Europe, Brock and Saurez (2000) for Latin America, and 
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Doliente (2003) for Asian countries. The general objective of multi-country studies is basically to 
establish whether countries, especially those that share some form of relationship, also share the 
same NIM environments.  
 
Single-country studies concern themselves with country-specific factors. Notable single-country 
studies were conducted by Zhou and Wong (2008) for mainland China, Zuzana and Tigran (2008) 
for Russia, Afanasieff et al. (2002) for Brazil and Naceur and Goaied (2001) for Tunisia. 
 
Irrespective of whether the study is single or cross-country, the determinants of NIMs can be divided 
into two categories: bank-specific and macroeconomic factors. According to Vong and Chan 
(2009:3), bank-specific determinants are those factors that are influenced by the bank’s management 
decisions which eventually affect the financial results of the bank. Management quality can be 
reflected in the operating performance of the bank as reflected in the financial variables. The 
financial variables include costs, asset and liability composition, size of operation and expenses 
management. 
 
The macroeconomic determinants of bank NIMs are those factors that are beyond the bank’s control 
and influence. Vong and Chan (2009:11) posit that good quality management can still anticipate 
changes in the external environment and try to position the bank to take advantage of the 
opportunities that may arise, thus minimising the risk. Vong and Chan (2009:11) identified the two 
major components of the external determinants as being macroeconomic and financial structure 
factors. Macroeconomic variables include gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, interest rates and 
exchange rates, among others.  
 
Financial structure factors relate to the relative importance of banks in the overall economy (Vong 
and Chan, 2009:12). A high bank asset-to-GDP ratio means that financial development plays a major 
part in the economy. This relative importance may attract new bank entrants into the economy and 
could result in increased competition and banking efficiency. Ultimately, increased competition will 
have an influence on the NIM structures.  
  
The study of NIMs is mainly anchored in two theoretical frameworks:-  
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1. The Dealer Model 
2. The Firm Theoretic Model 
The Dealer model is the most widely used in the studies that have been reviewed. In the Dealer 
model perspective, there are two empirical approaches. The first approach is based on the research of 
Ho and Saunders (1981) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000). In this approach the empirical 
estimation of the determinants of net interest margins follows a two-step process to account for 
explanatory variables not explicitly introduced into the theoretical model. The second approach is 
based on a single-step process that combines variables and imperfections in a single specification. 
The approach follows in the footsteps of McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo (1997). The 
single-step approach is most preferable as it does not require a long time series to estimate the pure 
margin. 
 
In both approaches the starting point is the regression specification underpinned by theory. The NIM 
theoretical framework identifies seven factors (dependent variables) which are regarded as the core 
of the model. The variables and the proxies used to represent them will be discussed in chapter three. 
  
There are considerable amounts of studies in the literature that cover the USA and Western Europe. 
There is also a sizable amount of study for Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia. However, there 
is a paucity of study for the case of Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa. Other than the Al-
Haschini (2007) and Flamini et al. (2009) studies, there is limited literature on Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In the particular case of South Africa, not much in terms of scientific research on NIMs could be 
accessed. The KPMG report (1998), though not strictly a scientific study provided some of the 
limited available literature on the NIM environment in South Africa. The study by KPMG did not go 
all the way to validate the statistical significance of the factors that were identified as relevant. In 
other words the report did not concern itself with scientific manipulation and analysis, but rather the 
descriptive narratives of the South African banking profitability environment.  
 
Contrasting the KPMG report to the theoretical model, it appears that the competitive structure of the 
market, the covariance between credit risk and interest rate risk, and the size of bank transactions do 
not influence NIMs in South Africa. Some of the factors identified in the KPMG report (1998:4) are 
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not considered as core variables according to the Dealer model theoretical framework. Instead, they 
may be treated as institutional and market imperfections that must be solved by a two-step regression 
process. 
 
Judging from the studies that have been reviewed, it would appear that interest margins and bank 
profitability determinants vary greatly across markets. In some instances there is contradiction on the 
relevance of significant factors. Macroeconomic factors may be critical in some markets but not in 
others. The same applies to bank-specific factors. This makes the choice of relevant factors for the 
study difficult. The literature on selection of appropriate factors offers no clear approach. Available 
studies seem to suggest a rule of thumb by starting from the variables suggested by the theoretical 
model. In the absence of a systematic way of determining relevant factors to include in the model, 
this approach appears to be plausible. As a result, the factors that relate to NIMs may be chosen 
either a priori or be guided by the theoretical model.  
 
2.7   Chapter summary 
Table 2.1 presents types of study methodology, the authors, and significant NIM determinants for 
numerous single and multi-country studies that have been conducted in various markets. 
TABLE 2.1:  Summary of previous studies on net interest margins 
 
Author & Year 
Study Published 
Type of study 
(Multiple 
country/Single 
country) 
Type of model and Data Identified Factors affecting NIMs 
Angbazo (1997) Multiple countries 
( USA and Europe) 
Single-step Dealer 
model ; 
Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) data 
1. Interest rate risk 
2. Credit risk 
3. Off-balance sheet items 
4. Bank size 
Chortareas, 
Garza-Garcia & 
Girardone (2011) 
Multiple 
countries(Latin 
American countries-
Peru, Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, Argentina, 
Brazil) 
Dealer model; 
Dynamic Panel  
(Generalised Methods of 
moments) 
1. Capital adequacy 
2. Competitive markets 
3. GDP 
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Dermerguc-Kunt 
& Huizinga 
(1998) 
Multiple countries 
(80 countries, both in 
developed and 
developing markets) 
Single-step Dealer 
model; 
 Account Identity 
regression Approach  
1. Bank characteristics 
2. Macroeconomic conditions 
3. Explicit and  implicit bank interests 
4. Regulation of deposit insurances 
5. General financial structure. 
6. Legal and institutional factors.  
Saunders & 
Schumacher 
(2000) 
Multiple countries 
(614 banks in Europe 
& USA)  
Two-step Dealer model; 
OLS data  
1. Interest rates volatility 
2. Bank capitalisation 
3. Market structure  
4. Regulatory requirements 
Brock & Saurez 
(2000) 
Multiple countries 
(6 Latin American 
Countries-Argentina, 
Colombia, Bolivia, 
Chile, Mexico and 
Peru) 
Two-step Dealer model; 
Panel Data 
1. High operational costs 
2. Non-performing loans 
3. Liquidity 
4. Capital risk 
5. Interest rate volatility 
6. Inflation 
7. GDP growth. 
Doliente (2003) Multiple countries 
(South East Asian 
countries- Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines 
& Thailand) 
Two-step Dealer model; 
OLS data 
1. Operating costs 
2. Capital amount 
3. Loan quality 
4. Collateral assets 
5. Liquid assets 
6. Interest rates 
7. Market structure  
Maudos & 
Guevara (2003) 
Multiple countries 
(European Union-
Germany, France, 
UK, Italy & Spain 
Single-step Dealer 
model; 
OLS data 
1. Degree of bank concentration 
2. Competitive structure of the market 
3. Operating costs 
4. Credit risk 
5. Interest rate volatility 
6. Bank income structure 
7. Implicit payments of interest 
8. Average production costs 
Emmanuelle 
NYS (2003) 
Multiple countries 
(twelve European 
countries) 
Firm theoretic 
approach/single-step 
Dealer model; 
OLS 
1. Operating costs,  
2. Interest rates  
3. Capital requirements  
4. Credit risk 
5. Opportunity cost 
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Martinez, Peria 
& Mody  (2004) 
Multiple countries 
(Argentina, Chile, 
Peru, Colombia and 
Mexico) 
Two-step Dealer model 
Panel data 
1. Bank concentration 
2. High costs 
3. Foreign entry 
4. Banking competition 
Mendes and 
Agrebu (2007) 
Multiple countries 
(four EU members, 
Portugal, Spain, 
France and Germany) 
Single-step Dealer 
model; 
 Account identity 
Approach and panel data  
1. Operating costs  
2. Bank capitalisation, 
3.  Inflation 
4. Risk aversion 
Havrylchk & 
Hurzyk (2006) 
Multiple countries 
(Hungary, Poland, 
Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia) 
Two-step Logit method 
panel data 
1. Foreign bank ownership 
Gelos (2006) Multiple countries 
(14 Latin American 
countries) 
Dealer model 
Panel data 
1. Bank efficiency 
2. Competition 
3. Interest rates 
4. Reserve requirements 
Naceur and 
Omran (2008) 
Multiple countries 
(MENA) 
Unbalanced panel data 1. Credit risk 
2. Bank capitalisation 
3. Inflation 
Al-Haschini 
(2007) 
Multiple countries 
(10 sub-Saharan 
African Countries) 
Accounting 
decomposition  
 Panel data  
 
1. Credit risk 
2. Market power 
Claeys and 
Vennet (2007) 
Multiple countries 
(31 countries in 
Western ,Central and 
Eastern Europe) 
SCP and E-S theoretical 
model; 
Panel regression 
1. Market share 
2. Bank concentration ratio. 
3. Capital to asset ratio 
4. Loans to asset ratio 
5. GDP growth 
6. Inflation 
7. Interest rate 
8. Bank ownership (foreign or domestic) 
 
Flamini, 
McDonald & 
Schumacher 
(2009) 
Multiple countries  
(389 banks in 41 sub- 
Saharan Africa) 
 1. Credit risk 
2. Bank size 
3. Activity diversification 
4. Inflation 
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5. Commodity prices 
Barajas et al. 
(1999) 
Single country 
(Columbia) 
Descriptive Approach 
 Panel data 
1. Loan quality 
Naceur & Goaied 
(2001) 
Single country 
(Tunisia) 
Panel data  1. Labour productivity 
2. Capital productivity 
3. Level of deposits accounts 
4. Size of overheads 
5. Level of capital 
6. Stock market development. 
Afanasieff et al. 
(2002) 
Single country 
(Brazil) 
Two-step Dealer model; 
 Panel Data  
Macroeconomic factors are significant 
1. GDP growth 
2. Interest rates volatility 
3. Exchange rate 
4. Inflation 
Brock & Franken 
(2003) 
Single country  
(Chile) 
Two-step dealer model 
Panel data 
1. Macroeconomic volatility 
2. Bank size and concentration 
3. Management efficiency 
4. Capital ratio 
Guru et al. 
(2002) 
Single country 
(Malaysia) 
Dealer model; 
Pooled OLS. 
1. Expenses Management 
2. Interest rates volatility 
3. Inflation 
Ben Khediri et al. 
(2005) 
Single country 
(Tunisia) 
Parametric & non- 
parametric methods. 
Panel Data 
1. Operating costs 
2. Leverage ratio 
3. Regulatory requirements 
Zhou and Wong 
(2008) 
Single country 
(mainland China) 
Single-step Dealer 
model; 
OLS data 
1. Structure of the market 
2. Operating costs 
3. Management risk aversion 
4. Money market interest rates 
5. Credit risk 
6. Covariance between credit risk and 
interest rate risk 
7. Size of bank transactions 
Zuzana  and 
Tigran (2008) 
Single country 
(Russia) 
Single-step Dealer 
model; 
OLS data 
1. Bank ownership 
2. Risk aversion 
3.  Credit risk 
4. Size of operations 
5. Liquidity 
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From the data in Table 2.1, it is evident that most single-country studies adopted the single-step 
classical linear regression analysis approach using cross-sectional data. On the other hand, most 
multi-country studies adopted the two-step panel regression technique.   
 
The two-step panel regression approach requires a time series long enough to establish the bank- 
specific factors. In most instances this is inhibited by data availability over a long time period. It is 
also complex to manipulate. For this reason the single-step regression approach was adopted for this 
study.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADOPTION AND APPLICATION OF NET INTEREST MARGIN MODEL 
 
3.1   Introduction 
In the previous chapter, literature on NIMs was reviewed. It was recognised that the definition of 
NIM is not standard, resulting in different studies adopting different definitions (Zuzana & Tigran 
2008:7). According to Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier’s observation in 2007 (cited in Chen 2009:5, 
Zuzana & Tigran 2008:7) the fact that studies have adopted either a ‘narrow’ or ‘wide’ definition is a 
problem in itself since the impact of net interest margins varies across the definitions of the margins. 
 
The literature revealed that major markets ranging from Europe, the Americas and the Far East have 
produced an abundance of studies that were conducted in the past. However, studies of NIMs in Sub-
Saharan Africa are limited. According to Chen (2009:3), this is due to low levels of financial 
development and limited market activity, which discourage research interest in Africa.  
 
In this chapter, a model to determine the relevant factors affecting NIMs in South Africa is presented 
based on the theoretical framework first pioneered by Ho and Saunders in 1981. The model is a 
standard approach to evaluating changes in NIMs due to changes in various economic factors. The 
model follows the approach adopted by Zhou and Wong (2008) and Zuzana and Tigran (2008) in 
their studies on determinants of NIMs in mainland China and Russia respectively. Both these studies 
used the single-step approach advocated by McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo (1997).  
 
This chapter is organised into seven sections. Section one summarises the findings of the literature 
review in chapter two. Section two elaborates on the Dealer Model Empirical regression 
specification. Section three focuses on the methodology adopted for analysis, while section four 
discusses the variables used in the model. Section five describes the study population and sample. 
Section six outlines the type of data used and the source of such data. Section seven summarises the 
chapter. 
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3.2   Empirical model 
There are two empirical approaches to the original Dealer model proposed by Ho and Saunders in 
1981 and the subsequent various extensions and modifications that followed it. These approaches are 
the single-step and the two-step approaches. The chief proponents and users of the single-step 
approach included McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo (1997). The approach was also used by 
Zhou and Wong (2008) and Zuzana and Tigran (2008) in their studies on mainland China and Russia 
respectively. In this approach both the variables posited by the theoretical model and the additional 
variables that reflect imperfections not incorporated into the modelling of the pure margin are 
combined together in a single regression specification. 
 
As the name suggests, the two-step approach involves a two-stage regression analysis. The first step 
controls for the effects of the explanatory variables of the net interest margins not explicitly 
introduced into the theoretical model. The result is an estimation of the ‘pure’ margin. The second 
step analyses the relationship between the pure margin and variables posited by the theoretical model 
(Maudos & Guevara, 2003:8). Ho and Saunders (1981) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000) were 
the main advocates of the two-step approach.  
 
According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:9) the two-stage approach requires a time series long 
enough to be able to estimate the pure margin. Ideally this covers periods spanning more than 10 to 
20 years. Economic trends over long periods are often interrupted by political, social and economic 
developments that often distort the patterns. For this reason, Maudos and Guevara (2003:9) 
considered the two-step approach to be problematic and disadvantageous in so far as uninterrupted 
data over a long time horizon may not be available. They therefore recommended that the approach 
be used cautiously.  
 
This study will employ the theoretical single-step Dealer model, following in the footsteps of 
Maudos and Guevara (2003), Zhou and Wong (2008) and Zuzana and Tigran (2008). The variables 
for the econometric regression specification are derived from first principle posited by the theoretical 
model as the starting point and are varied according to the idiosyncratic characteristics of each 
country or institution.  
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As shown in the previous chapter the original Dealer model theoretical regression equation is 
represented  in equation (19) in chapter two, which is reproduced here as follows:- 
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The dependent variable, S in the equation represents the net interest margin. The explanatory 
variables derived from the model are:- 
1. Competitive structure of the markets which depends on the elasticity of demand for loans and 
supply of deposits (α/β)  
2. Average operating costs indicated by C(L) and C(D) 
3. Risk aversion expressed by the coefficient of risk aversion  
     ̅ 
    ̅ 
 
4. The volatility of money market interest rates represented by    
    
5. The credit risk, reflected by    
  
6. The interaction or covariance between interest rate risk ,    
   and credit risk,     
7. The size of bank transactions. These are captured by average size of the credit and deposits 
operations, (L+D) and total volume of credits (L+2Lo) 
 
Variables L and D in the model indicate the amount of loans issued and deposits received while Lo 
and Mo are the original amount of loans and money market position respectively, at initial time to. 
 
Zuzana and Tigran (2008:9) and Zhou and Wong (2008:45) viewed the single-country nature of the 
study  as implying that the effects of macroeconomic variables are applicable to all banks in the same 
year and is captured by time dummy variables. Zhou and Wong (2008:45) further argued that as 
there may be discrepancies among the NIMs of individual banks, time dummy variables will be 
required anyway.  As a result, they opted to exclude the macroeconomic variables from the empirical 
specifications. This implies that money market interest rates as a macroeconomic variable, and the 
covariance between interest rate risk and credit risk, which is related to the macroeconomic variables, 
are accounted for by the time dummy variables. They are therefore explicitly excluded from the 
specification.  
 
In contrast, Maudos and Guevara (2003:7-8) and a sizeable number of other studies, maintained the 
macroeconomic variables in the regression equation as posited by the theoretical model. However, 
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they also do not include time dummy variables in their model. The suggestion here is that the time 
variables will be accounted for by changes in the captured macroeconomic variables. 
 
No rebuttal of Zuzan and Tigran (2008:9) and Zhou and Wong’s (2008:45) viewpoints on exclusion 
of macro-economic variables from the model could be found in the literature. It can therefore be 
concluded that either way, inclusion of the time dummy variable serves the same purpose as 
inclusion of a macroeconomic variable, as posited by the theory. This study will follow in the 
footsteps of Maudos and Guevara (2003) that introduced a macroeconomic variable into the model to 
cater for time variation. Money market interest rate volatility is chosen among numerous 
macroeconomic variables because the data is readily available. Interest rates are also considered as 
the leading indicator of economic activity (King & Watson, 1995: 1)   
 
In terms of the variables representing the imperfections that cannot be captured in the determination 
of pure NIMs, Zhou and Wong (2008:44) and Maudos and Guevara (2003:13) identified three 
similar variables: implicit interest payments, opportunity cost of bank reserves and quality of 
management. Zuzana and Tigran (2008:10) identified only one variable, the liquidity of banks, as 
representing the imperfections.  Ho and Saunders (1981:589) and Afanasieff et al. (2003:2) identified 
further imperfection variables as loan loss, bank capital, operating expenses and quality of 
management. The KPMG report (1998:28) highlighted that the NIM must be viewed in the context 
of the costs which it must cover. According to this report these costs, in the South African case, are 
operating costs (overheads), taxes, and loan losses costs. In the case of variables representing the 
market imperfections those most commonly recurring in the literature are implicit interest payments 
(IIP), opportunity cost of holding reserves, and quality of management (QM). 
 
This study will follow the theoretical model in so far as choice of base variables (those representing 
pure margin) is concerned. Most of the variables are bank-specific, the only exception being the 
volatility of money market interest rates representing macroeconomic influences. The base variables 
that are determinants of bank ‘pure’ net interest margins include competitive structure of the market 
(HERF), operating costs (C), degree of risk aversion (R), credit risk (Rc), and market interest rate 
volatility (Ir). The additional variables representing market imperfections are: 
1 Implicit interest payments (IIP) 
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2 Opportunity costs of bank reserves (OC) 
3 Quality of Management (QM)  
 
The single-step regression specification incorporating both the pure interest determinants and market 
imperfections will closely follow the model suggested by Zhou and Wong (2008:45). Following on 
from Zhou and Wong’s model and the variables posited by the theoretical model, the regression 
specification for this study is given as follows: 
                                                              (25) 
NIM indicates the dependent variable representing the net interest margin. The independent variables 
are defined as follows:- 
1.    is the regression intercept 
2. The Competitive structure of the market (HER) 
3. Average operating cost (C) on administering both loans and deposits 
4. Degree of risk aversion (R) 
5. Credit risk (Rc) 
6. Size of operations (Q) 
7. Interest rate volatility (  ) 
8. Implicit interest payments (IIP) 
9. Opportunity costs of bank reserves (OC) 
10. Quality of management (QM) 
11. The error term (ε) 
 
3.3  Methodology 
According to Brooks (2008:10) empirical specifications of the Dealer model form can be analysed 
either by cross-sectional analysis using the OLS method or by the panel estimation method. 
However, as Brooks (2008:153) noted, the OLS technique is static and allows for only a 
contemporaneous relationship between variables. However, practically the current value of the 
dependent variable can depend on previous values of both the dependent and explanatory variables. 
This means that the relationship is dynamic and extends beyond a single horizon. 
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Panel estimation technique is dynamic which means it has the dimension of both time series and 
cross-section, but is complex to manipulate. The panel data technique seems to be gaining popularity 
due to the use of sophisticated computer software to organise complex data. Even so, Brooks 
(2008:5) cautioned that panel data techniques must be used with great care because the regression 
models are very complex. It is also difficult to obtain balanced panel data. If unbalanced panel is 
used, the resulting data set may not be representative of the population (Brooks, 2008:5).  
 
This study will adopt the OLS data technique, owing to its widespread use and simplicity. The OLS 
technique is premised on certain statistical assumptions being fulfilled, without which it may suffer 
from some statistical reliability limitations. According to Brooks (2008:44) five assumptions are the 
bedrock of the OLS data technique, the violation of which leads to bias, inconsistency and loss of 
precision. A summary of the five assumptions is as follows:- 
 
Assumption one 
                                                                                                                                        (26) 
This assumption implies that the error terms have zero mean. The assumption is automatically 
fulfilled if a constant term, the intercept, is included in the regression equation (Brooks, 2008: 131). 
This means that α, in the proposed model specification for this study, given in equation 25, must not 
be equal to zero. If, after analysis, α equals zero, it means that the regression equation is mis-
specified and that the model must be re-estimated. 
 
Assumption two 
                                                                 
                                                                      (27) 
The assumption is interpreted to mean that the variance of the error terms is constant and finite over 
all values of the explanatory variable   . If this assumption is violated, that is, the variance of the 
error terms is not constant, heteroscedasticity is said to be present (Brooks, 2008:132). Using the 
OLS estimation technique in the presence of heteroscedasticity may mean that the standard errors 
could be wrong and the correctness of any inferences drawn from the results cannot be guaranteed. 
The inferences could actually be misleading (Brooks, 2008:135). In order to detect the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the data White’s diagnostic test will be performed on the residuals. In the event 
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that heteroscedasticity is found to be present in the error term, the Lagrange multiplier test will be 
used to solve the problem.  
 
Assumption three 
                                                    (     )                                                                          (28) 
Assumption three requires that the errors are linearly independent of one another. If the error terms 
are correlated with one another, autocorrelation is said to exist. Using the OLS technique in the 
presence of autocorrelation may result in the standard error terms being wrong. Wrong inferences on 
whether or not a variable is significant may be drawn (Brooks, 2008:149). A graphical test method 
will be used to test for autocorrelation. The test investigates whether any relationship exists between 
the current value of the error term and any of the previous values. The error term μ is plotted against 
the time t and also against the lagged value μt-1 and definitive graphical patterns emerge that indicate 
whether or not autocorrelation exists. 
 
In the case where the graphical method is not conclusive a more rigorous and complex test, the 
Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation, will be performed on the residuals to test for autocorrelation. 
If found to be present they will be corrected using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure (Brooks, 
2008:151) 
 
Assumption four 
                                                                                                    (29) 
The OLS technique assumes that the explanatory variables are not correlated with one another. The 
explanatory variables are said to be non-stochastic if they are not correlated with one another. If they 
are related, the problem of muticollinearity exists (Brooks, 2008:161). Multicollinearity results in 
high values of the goodness of fit statistics R2 making the regression look ‘good’ whereas the 
explanatory variables are not significant. A matrix of correlation diagnostic test method will be 
performed on the variables and if present, will be resolved through the method of dropping off of the 
correlated variables. Alternatively, a ratio method can be used (Brooks, 2008:173). 
 
Assumption five 
                                                                        
                                                                      (30) 
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OLS estimating technique assumes a normal distribution of residuals with fixed mean and variance. 
This enables hypothesis testing about the model parameters to be implemented (Brooks 2008:161).  
 
The Jarque-Bera test is used to test for normality. According to Brooks (2008:161), the diagnostic 
test uses the property of a normally distributed random variable so that the entire distribution is 
characterised by the mean and variance as first moments, and skewness and kurtosis as second 
moments. Skewness measures the extent to which a distribution is not symmetric about its mean 
value and kurtosis measures the ‘fatness’ of the tails of the distribution. A normal distribution is 
symmetric about its mean while a skewed distribution is not, but will have one tail longer than the 
other.  
 
The Jarque-Bera statistic specifically tests whether the coefficient of skewness and the coefficient of 
excess kurtosis are jointly zero (Brooks, 2008:163). The statistic is given by: 
                                   [
  
 
 
 
      
 
  
]                                                              (31) 
T is the sample size, and W, the test statistic, asymptotically follows a χ2 (2) under the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of the series is symmetric and mesokurtic. 
   
 [  ]
    
 
 ⁄
     and     
 [  ]
     
 
b1 and b2 can be estimated by using the residual from the OLS regression where μ is the error term 
and σ2 is the variance. The null hypothesis is of normality and would be rejected if the residual were 
either significantly skewed and not mesokurtic (Brooks, 2008:163). 
 
If non-normality exists it will be solved by using dummy variables to remove outlier observations 
(Brooks, 2008:165). 
 
3.3.1   Summary of OLS assumptions, diagnostic tests and solution 
The OLS assumptions, a diagnostic test to detect violation of assumptions, and a solution to remedy 
the problem caused by diversion from assumptions are summarised in Table 3.1 below. 
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TABLE 3.1: OLS assumptions and diagnostic tests 
Assumption Problem Diagnostic test Solution 
(1)          
 
Non-zero mean Regression 
specification 
Non-zero regression 
intercept 
(2)           
  
  
 
Heteroscedasticity White’s diagnostic 
test 
Lagrange Multiplier 
procedure 
(3)    (     )  
             
 
Autocorrelation Durbin-Watson 
test 
Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure 
(4)               
 
Multicollinearity Variable 
correlation matrix 
Ratio method/dropping 
of variables 
(5)         
   
 
Non Normality Jarque-Bera test Dummy variables. 
 
3.4   Model variables 
Following on the theoretical Dealer model formulation assumptions and the proposed variables, the 
variables that constitute the regression specification are now given. 
 
3.4.1   The dependent Variable, NIM 
A narrow definition of NIM will be adopted for this study. Zuzana and Tigran (2008:7) pointed out 
that the narrow definition of net interest margin is based on using only deposits and loans, as 
opposed to the wide definition that includes the impact of other banking activities such as securities 
and banking services. Information on securities and other banking activities is not always readily 
available, and if available, is not normally in a form that is readily usable (Zuzana & Tigran, 2008:8). 
 
The explanatory variables of the proposed model are summarized below. 
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3.4.2   Structure of the market (HERF)  
The competitive structure of the market is proxied by the Herfindahl index (HERF) which measures 
the degree of concentration of the market in which the banks operate. The index is defined as the sum 
of the squares of the market shares. According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:10), total assets are 
used as a proxy of banking activity. 
 
Greater monopoly power implies that the bank will have the ability to apply higher margins. Banks 
in more concentrated markets must be capable of adjusting margins in response to unfavourable 
macroeconomic environments in order to leave returns unaffected (Maudos and Guevara, 2003:10). 
A positive relationship with NIM is expected. 
 
3.4.3   Average operating costs (C) 
The variable captures the impact of operational costs on the NIM. Zhou and Wong (2008:44) and 
Maudos and Guevara (2003:11) agreed on the proxy for the average operating costs as a quotient 
between operational expense and total assets. Mendes and Abreu (2007:4) appeared to agree, as they 
used the quotient between the total employment costs to total assets to proxy for operating costs. It is 
however not clear from their study whether what they termed ‘employment costs’ represents the 
whole spectrum of operational expenses. According to Claeys and Vennet (2007:8), average 
operating expenses must include both interest expenses and other operating costs.  
 
The quotient between operational expenses to total assets will be adopted for this study as the proxy 
for operating costs. If a bank incurs high unit costs, it will apply higher margins to cover the higher 
costs (Zuzana and Tigran, 2008:9). Afanasieff et al. (2002:12), Maudos and Guevara (2003:11), 
Zhou and Wong (2008:43) concurred that there is a positive relationship between NIM and operating 
expenses. 
   
3.4.4   Degree of risk aversion (R) 
This variable is drawn from the theoretical assumption that the bank is a risk-averse player in the 
money market (Ho and Saunders, 1981:587). Higher margins imply a more risk-averse bank. The 
estimated coefficient for this variable is therefore expected to be positive. Zhou and Wong (2008:44), 
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Zuzana and Tigran (2008:9), Maudos and Guevara (2003:11) identified the appropriate proxy for this 
variable as the equity to total asset ratio, and they expected a positive relationship with NIM. 
 
3.4.5   Credit risk (Rc) 
The credit risk measures the risk of defaults on loans granted and reflects the uncertainty of the 
expected returns on these loans. Banks faced with higher loan defaults are exposed to higher credit 
risk. They will apply a risk premium that will reflect in higher margins (Maudos and Guevara, 
2003:8). The greater the volatility of the expected returns, the greater the NIM the bank will apply.  
 
Flamini et al. (2009:7) measured the credit risk using the ratio of loans to deposits on short-term 
funding. They argued that this provides a forward-looking measure of bank exposure to default and 
asset quality deterioration. In the Zuzana and Tigran study (2008:9), the appropriate proxy for credit 
risk is the ratio of the non-performing loans to total loans. Emmanuelle (2003:10) measured credit 
risk exposure by using the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans but conceded that this ratio is  
not always available for all countries. According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:12), the ideal proxy 
for credit risk would be factors such as problematic loans or insolvency provisions, but that these 
variables may not be readily available. Instead, they offered loans to total asset ratio as a reasonable 
proxy.  
 
Based on standard asset pricing theory a positive relationship is expected between NIM and credit 
risk. Maudos and Guevara (2003:13); Emmanuelle (2003:10) and Flamini et al. (2009:7) attested to 
the positive correlation between credit risk and NIM. In contrast Hanweck and Ryu (2005:20) 
theorised on a negative relationship between the two variables. They defined the value of an earning 
asset as composing of the promised value less the value of an option held by the bank to take over 
the asset of the borrower if the loan is not paid off on time and in full. An increase in the value of the 
option means that the credit quality of the borrower has decreased, thus increasing the bank’s credit 
risk. Hanweck and Ryu (2007:20) considered the promised value of the debt to be fixed, thus causing 
the value of the put option to directly reflect changes in credit risk. An increase in the value of the 
put option means that the put is closer to being in the money and default is more likely; hence the 
NIM has a negative relationship with credit risk. 
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3.4.6   Size of operations (Q) 
Maudos and Guevara (2003:8) claimed that NIM is an increasing function of average size of 
operations. The argument proffered is that for a given value of credit risk and market risk, an 
operation of greater size exposes the bank to a greater potential for loss. Flamini et al. (2009:8) 
agreed and said that size is a specific signal of bank risk. However, they also conceded that 
governments are less likely to allow big banks to fail. Moreover, if larger banks have a greater 
proportion of the domestic market and operate in a non-competitive market, lending rates may 
remain high while deposits rates are lower because they are perceived to be safer. As a result, the 
banks may enjoy higher margins. Zuzana and Tigran (2008:8-9) argued in favour of lower margins 
by saying that the economies of scale suggest that higher volumes of loans issued and deposits 
accepted must lead to lower margins. In this case, an inverse relationship would be expected. 
Runkle’s observation in 1993 (cited in Flamini et al. 2009:8) indicated a significant inverse 
relationship between size and rate of return on assets in USA banks from 1971 to 1990, and a 
positive correlation between financial leverage and size. However, there is no theoretical support to 
rationalise the evidence. 
 
The theoretical model suggests a positive coefficient between operations size and NIM. However, 
due to counter arguments on this variable, the expected sign of the coefficient is therefore not certain 
upfront prior to analysis. Flamini et al. (2009:8) also confirmed this by saying that in the literature, 
results obtained for the relationship between size and profits are diverse. 
 
Zuzana and Tigran (2008:9) affirmed that the logarithm of total assets is the appropriate proxy for the 
variable, whereas Zhou and Wong (2008:44) preferred the logarithm of total loan volume granted. 
Both these proxies are a departure from the theoretical model which prescribes the average size of 
credits and loans as the explanatory variable. Maudos and Guevara (2003:13) explained that in most 
cases it is difficult to proxy this variable by the average size of loans and credits, as this information 
is not normally available in the required format. They therefore concurred with Zhou and Wong 
(2008) in using the logarithm of the volume of loans granted as the proxy for size of operations. 
Flamini et al. (2009:8) captured the relationship between size and NIM by using the logarithm of 
total assets and their square. 
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3.4.7   Volatility of money market interest rates ( ) 
According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:8), the more volatile the money market interest rates the 
greater the market risk. Banks will then find it necessary to operate with higher margins as a risk 
premium. To the contrary, there is some evidence from Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga study 
(1998:20) that real interest rises do not increase margins as much in developed countries as in 
developing countries. They attributed this discrepancy to deposit rate ceilings in the developed 
countries. 
 
Maudos and Guevara (2003:12) used the annual standard deviation on daily interest rates to proxy 
the volatility of interest rate variables. 
 
3.4.8   Implicit interest payments (IIP) 
Zhou and Wong (2008:44) posited that banks may pay implicit interest payments on deposits, such 
as service charges, or if the industry is regulated, banks may compete with other payments offered to 
depositors and borrowers. These other payments are equal to some of the implicit payments offered 
to the bank customers. Zhou and Wong (2008:44) and Maudos and Guevara (2003:13) concur that 
this variable is proxied by operating expenses net of non-interest revenue and is expressed as a 
percentage of total assets. A positive relationship is anticipated. 
 
3.4.9   Opportunity cost of bank reserves (OC) 
The required reserves or excess reserves that the commercial banks hold at the reserve bank bear 
interest at a lower rate than on the open money market. In some instances the central bank rates may 
even be zero (Zhou & Wong, 2008:44). This comes as an additional cost over and above published 
interest expenses. The additional cost depends on the size of the reserves and the opportunity cost of 
holding the reserves. There is therefore a positive relationship between NIM and opportunity cost. 
There is agreement between Zhou and Wong (2008:44) and Maudos and Guevara (2003:13) that this 
variable is most appropriately measured by the ratio of cash due from banks, divided by total assets.  
 
3.4.10   Quality of management (QM) 
Maudos and Guevara (2003:13) accepted that high quality management translates into a profitable 
composition of assets and a low-cost composition of liabilities. It is measured by cost to income 
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ratio. A negative sign is expected since an increase in this ratio means a decrease in management 
quality, which will translate into a lower interest margin. 
 
3.5   Study population and sample 
There are 27 deposit accepting and loan issuing banks/institutions registered in South Africa. These 
banks will form the population of the study. The sample of this study consists of the four biggest 
commercial banks in South Africa: ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedbank and First National Bank. A non- 
probabilistic judgment (purposive) sampling was used to select the four banks, based on the 
judgment that these banks will exhibit the characteristics required to determine the drivers of NIMs 
in South Africa. According to Zikmund (2003:392) the basis of judgment sampling is that the sample 
is selected to fulfil a purpose such as ensuring that all members of a sample exhibit certain 
characteristics. The sample is guaranteed to meet specific objectives. Zikmund, however, cautioned 
that bias due to a selector’s beliefs may make the sample unrepresentative. As a result, projecting 
data beyond the sample may be inappropriate.   
  
As shown in Table 3.2 below, eight out of the 27 deposit accepting and loan issuing banks are listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (JSE Ltd). Of the banks listed, the four biggest 
commercial banks constitute 90% by market capitalisation as at May 2010. 
TABLE 3.2: Market capitalisation of JSE Ltd listed commercial banks 
Sector Index-Banks 
Name Code Year End Next Results Market Cap  
(R, millions) 
ABSA Bank Ltd ASA Dec Jun 2010 (Interim) 87 909m 
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd CPI Feb Aug 2010 (Interim) 8 613m 
First Rand Ltd (FNB) FRS Jun Jun 2010 (Final) 106 130m 
Mercantile Bank Holdings Ltd MTL Dec Jun 2010 (Interim) 867m 
Nedbank Ltd NED Dec Jun 2010 (Interim) 63 773m 
RMB Holdings Ltd RMH Jun Jun  2010 (Final) 36 310m 
Saambou Holdings Ltd (suspended) SBO Mar - 339m 
Standard Bank Ltd SBK Dec Jun 2010 (Interim) 166 216m 
Source: Author’s own deductions  
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In addition, the KPMG report (1998:3) indicated that the South African banking market 
concentration is more than 71%. Bank concentration is defined as the ratio of the three largest banks’ 
assets to total banking sector assets. According to the DI 190/BA 900 returns submitted by the banks 
to the registrar of banks, the four major banks represent 80% of the industry on a net interest after tax 
basis (Reserve Bank of South Africa, 2010). In the same report the registrar of banks noted that the 
South African banking system is well developed and effectively regulated, comprising a central 
bank, a few large, financially strong banks and investment institutions, and a number of smaller 
banks. This fact, coupled with the level of market capitalisation and the degree of concentration 
indicates that the four major banks are a good proxy for the banking market in South Africa.  
  
3.6   Data   
Data used in this study is seasonally adjusted annual interval data for the four biggest commercial 
banks in South Africa, namely Standard Bank, Nedbank, FNB and ABSA. Analysis is limited to 
commercial banks so that comparisons over markets are limited to one type of institution. 
Considering commercial banks only allows focus to be directed at the intermediary role of banks. 
  
The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. There are two reasons for the choice of this sample period. 
Firstly, data from Bankscope beyond 2000 is incomplete and unreliable. Secondly, the year 2002, is 
critical in South Africa’s financial history. It is soon after the year 2000 that the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) began to conduct its monetary policy within an inflation targeting framework 
(www.reservebank.co.za). Before then and prior to the dawning of democracy, the South African 
economy was heavily regulated (KPMG report, 1998:3). Limiting the sample period to a time after 
2000 would prevent results from being directly influenced by the regulatory framework in place 
before then.  
 
The availability of annual observation for 11 years from 2000 to 2010 makes it impossible to apply a 
two-step Dealer model approach because the series is not long enough. It is for this reason that this 
study proposes to adopt the single-step Dealer model regression specification. 
 
The availability of only 11 data points in the series (from 2000 to 2010) brings into question whether 
the series is long enough: that is, whether the sample meets minimum size requirements. In statistical 
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terms, Zikmund (2003:423) says that increasing the sample size decreases the width of the 
confidence interval (magnitude of error) at a given confidence level. In other words, the larger the 
sample, the more accurate the research is. Zikmund prescribes a minimum size of sample that is 
dependent on standard deviation of the population, magnitude of error and the confidence level. 
 
Hyndman and Kostenko (2007:12) pointed out that in reality, forecasts may be required for very 
short timelines and it is helpful to understand the minimum sample requirements when fitting 
statistical models to such data. They posited that the number of data points required for any statistical 
model depends on at least two things: the number of model coefficients (parameters) to estimate and 
the amount of randomness in the data. If the data contains a lot of random variation it is necessary to 
have a lot of data.  
 
From a statistical point of view, Hyndman and Kostenko (2007:13) recorded that it is always 
necessary to have more observations than coefficients (parameters). In the case of the model for this 
study given in equation 23, there are eight coefficients. This, according to Hyndman and Kostenko, 
implies that nine data points will be the theoretical minimum. For this study 11 data observations are 
made, from 2000 to 2010, suggesting that the sample size meets minimum sample requirements.  
 
Further to the Hyndman and Kostenko (2007:13) approach on minimum sample size, Zikmund 
(2003:428) proposes another method of selecting sample size based on managerial judgment. Using a 
sample size similar to the sample sizes used in previous studies provides the researcher with a 
comparison of other researchers’ judgments. Zuzana and Tigran (2008:10-11) used nine data 
observations (1999 to 2007) for a regression model with six coefficients for their study on bank net 
interest margins in Russia. Maudos and Guevara (2003:24) used eight data points (1993 to 2000) for 
a model with 15 coefficients in their study of net interest margins in the banking sectors of Europe. 
Mendes and Abreu (2007:3- 4) used eight observations (1992 to1999) to manipulate a model with 13 
coefficients in their study of European bank net interest margins. Similarly, Doliente (2003:18-19) 
used six data points (1994 to1999) for a model with 13 coefficients to estimate determinants of NIMs 
in South East Asia. Following the Zikmund (2003:428) managerial judgment approach on precedent 
set by other studies; the proposed sample size appears to be adequate and can be manipulated in its 
current form.  
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3.6.1   Data type 
The financial data for the four biggest banks in South Africa used in this study is secondary data, in 
that it is data which was gathered and recorded by another party prior to its use in this study. This 
data is therefore historical, already assembled and does not require access to respondents. According 
to Zikmund (2003:136), secondary data is data that has been collected for some purpose other than 
the one at hand. 
 
Secondary data is most suitable for this study as NIM determinants are often and most appropriately 
estimated with secondary data. According to Zikmund (2003:155), fact finding and model building 
are amenable to secondary data use. In addition, secondary data was accessed more rapidly and less 
expensively than would have been the case with primary data.  
 
As is usually the case, secondary data is not always pertinent to the study in question due to the fact 
that it was not designed for the needs of the study in question. As a result there is always potential for 
data inaccuracy, bias, and lack of soundness. The data gathered for this study was not consistent with 
the need as it did not go back far enough to afford the option of using a two-step Dealer model 
approach. In addition, data on the same elements but obtained from different sources such as 
websites, Macgregor, and Bankscope, was often different and inconsistent. This has forced adoption 
of base data from one source only. Bankscope appeared to be the most credible of available sources 
and is used worldwide.   
 
3.6.2 Data sources 
Data at the bank level for the period 2000 to 2010 was derived from the Bankscope data base which 
is maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. Data was also obtained from the respective annual reports of the 
banks from 2000 to 2010. The data was compiled from the Income Statements, Balance Sheets, and 
Statements of Changes in Equity. As the four banks are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE), their financial statements were readily available on the banks’ websites. However, the 
integrity of the data from the banks’ websites was questionable as they lacked consistency across the 
years. In addition, FNB data could not be obtained separately from the website as it was consolidated 
into the group results. 
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Due to the suspect nature of the data from the individual banks’ websites, it was decided to use data 
from Bankscope and to verify with McGregor BFA. Bankscope is a comprehensive global data base 
of banks’ financial statements, ratings and intelligence. It combines widely sourced data with flexible 
software for searching and analysing banks. It has accumulated about 16 years of detailed accounts 
of most of the banks in the world. 
 
3.7   Summary  
The regression model to be adopted for this study is in the following form:- 
                                                       
The variables of the model for the case of South Africa have been identified and are indicated in 
Table 3.3.  
TABLE 3.3: Summary of variables of the proposed empirical regression model 
Variable Notation Proxy Expected impact 
Net interest margin NIM N/A N/A 
Structure of the market HERF Square of total Assets/Sum of square 
of total assets 
Positive (+) 
Average operating cost C operational expense (interest expense 
plus other operating expenses/ total 
assets) 
Positive (+) 
Degree of Risk Aversion R Equity/total asset ratio Positive (+) 
Credit Risk Rc Loans/total asset ratio Positive (+) 
Size of operations Q logarithm of the volume of loans granted Not certain 
Market interest rates 
volatility 
Ir Annual Standard deviation on monthly 
interest rates 
Positive (+) 
Implicit interest payments IIP Net non-interest expense/Total assets Positive(+) 
Opportunity costs of bank 
reserves 
OC Liquid reserves (cash due from 
banks/Total Assets) 
Positive (+) 
Quality of management QM Cost/income Negative (-) 
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The sources for the data used in the study are shown in Table 3.4 below. 
TABLE 3.4: Sources of data used in the study 
Source Location of source 
Bankscope www.bvdinfo.com (access upon subscription) 
Standard Bank www.standardbank.co.za 
ABSA Bank www.absa.co.za 
First Rand (FNB) www.firstrand.co.za 
Nedbank www.nedcor.com 
South African Reserve Bank www.reservebank.co.za 
Macgregor www.macgregorbfa.co.za 
 
 
70 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
4.1   Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the underlying theoretical framework and subsequent Dealer model 
employed as a basis for the regression analysis to determine significant factors influencing NIMs in 
South Africa were discussed. The Dealer model, pioneered by Ho and Saunders in 1981, is 
underpinned by a fundamental assumption of bank behaviour: that the net interest margins must be 
maximised for the benefit of investors. Net interest margins must therefore respond to both internal 
and external economic factors (Hanweck and Ryu, 2005:7). 
 
The Dealer model was found to have fundamental limitations that prompted several authors to 
suggest modifications and extensions to the original model. The two main limitations of the original 
model were that the model was a one-period decision tool (Zhou and Wong, 2008:42) and that 
different banks have specific production functions that cannot be generalised. These limitations have 
resulted in many authors and researchers considering attempts to determine ‘pure’ net interest margin 
as a fallacy.  
 
The diversion of views on the original Dealer model led to two fundamental approaches to the 
determination of NIMs: the original single-step approach advocated by McShane and Sharpe (1985) 
and Angbazo (1997), and the two-step approach made popular by Brock and Saurez (2000). The two-
step approach was developed as a solution to remedy the limitations of the original model.  
 
Chapter three outlined the advantages of the single-step over the two-step approach. The single-step 
approach can still be used in situations where the data series is of a short horizon. It is simple to 
manipulate and requires less complex analytical tools. However, the single-step method has its own 
shortcomings. It does not capture the ‘pure’ interest margin that is influenced by market, institutional 
and regulatory imperfections.  
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The chapter also discussed the two major data analysis techniques, namely the OLS and panel data 
estimation techniques. It also discussed the variables recommended for the model and the diagnostic 
tests to deal with any bias and inconsistencies that may arise from using the OLS technique. 
 
Chapter four summarises and presents the empirical results of regression analysis to test the 
significant factors that affect bank net interest margins in South Africa. The study employs the 
Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) data estimation 
technique.  
 
Chapter four is organised into eight sections: Section 4.1 is the introduction to the chapter. Section 
4.2 presents the data analysis approach employed in the study while section 4.3 compares the 
quantitative characteristics of the variables across the sample banks. Section 4.4 presents the 
descriptive statistics over the study period of the individual banks that make up the study sample. 
Regression results at country-level are presented in section 4.5 while section 4.6 presents the 
diagnostic tests and results to check that the CLRM and OLS estimation technique assumptions are 
satisfied. Individual empirical results for each of the four banks are presented in section 4.7. Section 
4.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2    Data analysis approach 
In order to build a statistically adequate empirical model which satisfies the assumptions of the 
Classical Linear Regression Model, the study followed the general-to-specific approach 
recommended by Brooks (2008:191).  The general-to-specific approach results in a model that is 
parsimonious, has the appropriate theoretical interpretation and has the correct sign and size of the 
coefficients. 
 
According to Brooks (2008:191), the general-to-specific approach involves starting with a large 
number of variables and moving in steps by restricting and subtracting insignificant variables and 
rearranging the model until the final formulation is reached. Though there is a rival approach, the 
specific-to-general approach (sometimes called the Average Economic Regression) that starts with 
the simplest form and is then built by adding variables in a stepwise fashion to a complex final 
model, this alternative has distinct disadvantages as compared to the general-to-specific approach. 
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The biggest disadvantage is that diagnostic testing is not normally implemented, and if performed is 
usually performed at the end of the model-building process. In the event that the model is mis-
specified, the diagnostic tests themselves may not be helpful to identify the source of the problem 
(Brooks, 2008:192). 
 
Following the general-to-specific approach, the variables included in the model as a starting point are 
the net interest margin (NIM), as the dependent variable, market structure measured by the 
Herfindahl index (HERF), average operating costs (C), risk aversion (R), credit risk (Rc), size of 
operations (Log Q), market interest rate volatility (Ir), opportunity cost of holding reserves (OC) and 
the quality of management (QM). The variable IIP was removed from the model because one of the 
banks, First Rand Bank (FNB), did not have data on the variable in the appropriate format. 
 
4.3   Bank-specific variables: Comparisons 
4.3.1   Net interest margins 
ABSA has the highest average net interest margins of 3.52% over the sample period, followed by 
Standard Bank at 3.12%, while FNB at 2.72% has the lowest. Figure 4.1 presents a comparison of 
average NIMs for the four sample banks over the study period. 
 
FIGURE  4.1: Comparison of banks’ average NIM, 2000-2010 
                               Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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4.3.2 Market structure 
The competitive structure of the market is measured by the Herfindahl index, (HHI) which measures 
the size of firms in relation to the industry. It is an indicator of the amount of competition among 
firms. The index is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the 50 largest firms 
within the industry (or summed over all the firms if there are fewer than 50) (Maudos & Guevara, 
2008:10). Market shares are expressed as fractions of the total sum.  
  
According to Maudos and Guevara (2003:10), total assets are used as a proxy for banking activity. 
Figure 4.2 below demonstrates that FNB has the biggest market share at 31% followed by Standard 
Bank at 26%, with ABSA and Nedbank at 23% and 20% respectively. 
  
FIGURE  4.2: Comparison of banks’ average market share, 2000–2010 
                              Source: Own deduction, 2011 
4.3.3 Average operating costs 
As can be seen in Table 4.3, ABSA at 0.0344 has higher operating costs than any of the other banks, 
followed by Nedbank at 0.0310, while FNB at 0.0290 has the least costs. ABSA also has the highest 
NIM (3.52%), giving credence to the assertion of Zuzana and Tigran (2008:4), Afanasieff et al. 
(2002:14), Naceur (2003:12) and Maudos and Guevara (2003:7) that a bank that incurs high unit 
costs will apply higher margins to cover the higher costs. FNB has the lowest average operating costs 
as well as the lowest NIM of 2.72%. 
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FIGURE  4.3: Comparison of banks’ average operational costs, 2000-2010 
                              Source: Own deduction, 2011 
4.3.4 Risk aversion 
Figure 4.4 indicates that Nedbank has the lowest affinity to risk, followed by FNB. Standard Bank is 
less averse to risk taking than the other three banks. Taking the comparative average NIM levels as 
indicated in Figure 4.1 and the degree of risk aversion in Figure 4.4, there appears to be a 
contradiction to the viewpoint of Zhou and Wong (2008:43) that higher margins imply a more risk-
averse bank. The two most risk-averse banks have the lowest NIMs. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE  4.4: Comparison of banks’ average degree of risk aversion 
                               Source: Own deduction, 2011  
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4.3.5 Credit risk 
ABSA has more exposure to credit risk than any other bank, followed by Nedbank. FNB has the least 
exposure. The result appears to fit in well with the expectation of the theoretical model that suggests 
that banks that are exposed to higher credit risk will apply a risk premium that will reflect in higher 
margins (Maudos & Guevara, 2003:15). ABSA has the highest NIMs while FNB has the lowest. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE  4.5: Comparison of banks’ average credit risk exposure, 2000-2010 
                               Source: Own deduction, 2011 
4.3.6 Average size of operations 
As reflected in Figure 4.6, ABSA and Standard Bank have the biggest operations as measured by 
volume of loans granted. The two banks also have the highest average NIM levels respectively. 
Though there is argument among researchers and authors as to whether NIMs are a decreasing or 
increasing function of operation size, this result appears to agree with the theoretical model that 
suggests a positive relationship between size and NIMs. The idea is also supported by Maudos and 
Guevara (2003:8) and Flamini et al. (2009:13).  
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On the other hand, Zuzana and Tigran (2008:16) and Runkle (cited in Flamini et al. 2009:8) argued 
that economies of scale represented by higher volumes of loans granted should lead to lower 
margins, in which case a negative relationship is to be expected.  
 
 
FIGURE  4.6: Comparison of banks’ average size of operations, 2000–2010 
                           Source: Own deduction, 2011 
4.3.7 Opportunity cost of reserves 
FNB and Nedbank at 0.0792 and 0.0363 respectively incur more additional costs of holding reserves 
at the central bank than the other two banks. At the same time these two banks enjoy the least NIMs 
at 2.72 and 3.035 respectively. There is a clear contradiction with theory that suggests that there must 
be a positive relationship between NIMs and opportunity cost because banks that incur higher costs 
must recover them through higher margins.  
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FIGURE  4.7: Comparison of banks’ average opportunity cost, 2000–2010 
                  Source: Own deduction, 2011 
4.3.8 Quality of management 
Quality of management as measured by average cost to income ratio indicates that FNB and Standard 
Bank at 51.45 and 54.48 respectively, are better managed than ABSA (61.91) and Nedbank (64.4). 
There appears to be general agreement with theory. The theory states that high quality management 
translates into a profitable composition of assets and a low-cost composition of liabilities. A negative 
relationship with NIM would therefore be expected, since an increase in this ratio means a decrease 
in quality of management. This will translate into a lower interest margin. 
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   FIGURE  4.8: Comparison of banks’ average quality of management, 2000-2010 
                    Source: Own deduction, 2011 
4.4    Bank-specific descriptive statistics 
Tables 4.1 to Table 4.4 present the descriptive statistics for NIMs and the explanatory variables for 
the individual banks. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. The distributional properties include 
minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. 
TABLE 4.1: Standard Bank descriptive statistics 
NIM 2.4700 4.1300 3.1155 0.6578 0.7113 -1.2725  21.1138 
HERF 2.4700 0.2681 0.2579 0.0040 1.9488 4.4302  1.5342 
C 0.0195 0.0407 0.0292 0.0068 0.5837 -0.7741  23.4038 
R 0.0430 0.0821 0.0538 0.0108 2.0118 4.9013  20.0249 
Rc 0.5239 0.7170 0.6026 0.0575 0.8872 0.1019  9.5356 
Log Q 5.0807 5.7364 5.4562 0.2485 -0.2221 -1.6109  4.5537 
Ir 0.2261 2.1998 0.7855 0.6242 1.4511 1.5410  79.4622 
OC 0.0149 0.0597 0.0269 0.0133 1.7137 3.0689  49.3650 
QM 46.1700 60.1600 54.4755 4.5301 -0.6691 -0.7097  8.3159 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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If variability (measured by standard deviation) of 10% from mean score is considered as high, net 
interest margin (NIM), average operating cost C and risk aversion R have a large variability of data 
between 20% and 24%.  Percentage standard deviation of interest rate volatility Ir and opportunity 
cost exhibit very high variations of 79.4% and 49.36% respectively. According to Hyndman and 
Kostenko (2007:13) such high data randomness may lead to inaccurate regression and may need to 
be smoothed by dummy variables in the case where data is seasonal. 
 
Only two variables, Size of operation Log Q and quality of management, QM, have negative 
skewness indicating that distribution is not symmetric about the mean value but has long tails to the 
left. Market structure HERF, risk aversion R, interest rate volatility Ir and opportunity cost OC 
variables have skewness greater than one indicating long tails to the right. This means that most of 
the values of these variables are greater than the mean. In terms of the skewness of the dependent 
variable NIM, it is close to zero (0.7113) indicating that the NIM returns are not excessive relative to 
the assets of the bank.  
 
Only three of the variables, HERF, R and OC have a kurtosis greater than three, (the kurtosis of a 
normal distribution), indicating peaked distribution (Brooks, 2008:161).  
 
TABLE 4.2: Nedbank descriptive statistics 
Variabl
es Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis  % stnd dev 
NIM 2.3300 3.6500 3.0345 0.4247 -0.4454 -0.8666  14.0% 
HERF 0.2538 0.2681 0.2579 0.0040 1.9488 4.4302  1.5% 
C 0.0238 0.0495 0.0310 0.0068 2.2825 6.5345  21.8% 
R 0.0525 0.0927 0.0647 0.0107 1.8878 4.8273  16.6% 
Rc 0.6437 0.8020 0.7427 0.0520 -1.0776 0.1264  7.0% 
Log Q 5.0291 5.6685 5.4084 0.2266 -0.4399 -1.1507  4.2% 
Ir 0.2261 2.1998 0.7855 0.6242 1.4511 1.5410  79.5% 
OC 0.0283 0.0501 0.0363 0.0073 0.8984 -0.5842  20.0% 
QM 36.9200 84.9800 64.4082 14.9529 -0.1470 -0.4889   23.2% 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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Net interest margin (NIM), average operating cost C, risk aversion R, opportunity cost OC and 
quality of management QM, have high variability of data, between 14% and 24%.  
  
Four variables, net interest margin NIM, credit risk Rc, size of operations Log Q and quality of 
management QM have negative skewness indicating that distribution is not symmetric about the 
mean value but has long tails to the left. The variables market structure HERF, average operating 
costs C, risk aversion R, and credit risk Rc have skewness greater than one indicating long tails to the 
right. This indicates that most of the values are greater than the mean. As in the case of Standard 
Bank, NIM skewness is close to zero (0.4454) indicating that the NIM returns are not excessive 
compared to the assets of the bank.  
 
Variables HERF, C and R have a kurtosis greater than three indicating that the distribution is peaked. 
 TABLE 4.3: FNB descriptive statistics 
Variables Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis  % stnd dev 
NIM 2.2400 3.3700 2.7227 0.4610 0.5920 -1.8469  16.9% 
HERF 0.2538 0.2681 0.2579 0.0040 1.9488 4.4302  1.5% 
C 0.0220 0.0362 0.0290 0.0043 -0.0544 -0.7025  14.9% 
R 0.0537 0.0698 0.0635 0.0052 -0.7786 -0.0893  8.3% 
Rc 0.4585 0.5416 0.4958 0.0304 0.2811 -1.6436  6.1% 
Log Q 5.0487 5.6754 5.4184 0.2212 -0.3107 -1.1550  4.1% 
Ir 0.2261 2.1998 0.7855 0.6242 1.4511 1.5410  79.5% 
OC 0.0177 0.2763 0.0792 0.0735 2.1302 5.6181  92.7% 
QM 37.2300 58.9800 51.4518 6.9922 -1.3644 1.0496  13.6% 
 Source: Own deduction, 2011 
Net interest margin (NIM), average operating cost C and opportunity cost OC have high variability of 
data, between 13% and 17%.  Quality of management QM has excessively high variability of 92%. 
 
Four variables, average operating costs C, risk aversion R, size of operations Log Q and quality of 
management QM have negative skewness indicating that distribution is not symmetric about the 
mean value but has long tails to the left.  Variables market structure HERF, credit risk Rc and 
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opportunity cost OC, have skewness greater than one indicating long tails to the right meaning that 
most of the values are greater than the mean. As in the case of the Standard Bank and Nedbank 
NIMs, skewness is close to zero (0.5920) indicating that the NIM returns are not excessive.  
 
Variables HERF, and OC have a kurtosis greater than three, the kurtosis of a normal distribution, 
indicating peaked distribution. 
 
TABLE 4.4: ABSA descriptive statistics 
Varia
ble Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis  % Stn deviation 
NIM 2.9600 4.1200 3.5191 0.3525 0.3774 -0.3278  10.0% 
HERF 0.2538 0.2681 0.2579 0.0040 1.9488 4.4302  1.5% 
C 0.0260 0.0457 0.0344 0.0066 0.4611 -0.9720  19.2% 
R 0.0462 0.0773 0.0586 0.0094 0.7043 0.1764  16.0% 
Rc 0.7230 0.8474 0.7865 0.0425 -0.0775 -0.7720  5.4% 
Log Q 5.1682 5.7382 5.4763 0.2158 -0.1518 -1.5829  3.9% 
Ir 0.2261 2.1998 0.7855 0.6242 1.4511 1.5410  79.5% 
OC 0.0154 0.0674 0.0332 0.0147 1.1779 2.1329  44.2% 
QM 52.0300 70.8200 61.9091 6.2868 -0.2469 -1.1217  10.2% 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
In the case of ABSA, average operating cost C and degree of risk aversion R have high data 
variability of between 16% and 19%. Opportunity cost OC has exceptionally high variability at 44%. 
 
Three variables, credit risk Rc, size of operations Log Q and quality of management QM, have 
negative skewness, indicating that distribution is not symmetric about the mean value but has long 
tails to the left. Variables market structure HERF, and opportunity costs OC, have skewness greater 
than one indicating long tails to the right, meaning that most of the values are greater than the mean. 
As in the case of the other three banks, NIM skewness for ABSA is close to zero (0.3774) indicating 
that NIM returns are not excessive.  
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Only HERF has a kurtosis greater than three, indicating peaked distribution for this variable. 
 
In conclusion, there does not appear to be a definitive pattern on data variability and distributional 
properties of variables across the banks. This may be an indication that each bank is largely driven by 
its own internal and specific dynamics in determining its own NIM levels. This makes the study 
pertinent because the emphasis of the study is to determine the idiosyncratic factors of each bank. 
Macroeconomic factors are in most instances common to all banks. However, no prior study 
provides any in-depth interpretation of descriptive statistics to provide a basis for judgemental 
guidelines on the significance of distributional statistics. 
   
4.5    Country-level empirical findings 
Most studies, probably due to the size of their samples which made it impossible to analyse 
individual banks separately, employed mean values of data across all the sample elements. Typical 
examples of such studies were conducted by Mendes and Abreu (2007), Zhou and Wong (2008), 
Flamini et al. (2009) and Chortareas, Garza-Garcia, and Girardone (2011). 
  
The same approach of using average data across banks was employed for this study. It can be 
demonstrated that the theoretical model does not have the power to predict NIMs and is not robust in 
this case. Table 4.5 below shows that all the seven explanatory variables excepting the Credit risk Rc 
(t-statistic =2.55) are statistically insignificant at the five per cent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
TABLE 4.5: Regression results for averaged data from the four banks 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.8291        
R Square 0.6873        
Adjusted R2  -0.0422        
Stnd Error 0.2827        
Observations 11        
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -5.1142 21.5188 -0.2377 0.8274 -73.596 63.3682 -73.5966 63.3682 
HERF 16.6463 55.4575 0.3002 0.7837 -159.8443 193.1368 -159.8443 193.1368 
Cost C -4.1062 97.1944 -0.0422 0.9690 -313.422 305.2097 -313.4222 305.2097 
 R -12.3198 53.3149 -0.2311 0.8321 -181.991 157.3519 -181.9915 157.3519 
 Rc 9.6749 15.6964 0.6164 0.5813 -40.2782 59.6279 -40.2782 59.6279 
Log Q -0.2886 2.2007 -0.1312 0.9040 -7.2923 6.7150 -7.2923 6.7150 
 Ir -0.1103 0.1890 -0.5836 0.6005 -0.7117 0.4911 -0.7117 0.4911 
 OC 2.0149 15.9289 0.1265 0.9073 -48.6781 52.7078 -48.6781 52.7078 
 
       
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
Furthermore, the credit risk variable Rc only becomes statistically significant after applying a 
general-to-specific approach which eliminated all the other variables until only Rc remains in the 
final formulation of the model. Table 4.6 below indicates that in the final model, the adjusted R2 is 
only 52% meaning that Rc can only predict 52% of the movement in the NIM.  
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TABLE 4.6: Regression results for a reduced model 
SUMMARY         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.817        
R Square 0.667        
Adjusted R2  0.524        
Stnd Error 0.191        
Observations 11        
  
 
 
Coefficients 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
 
t Stat 
 
 
P-value 
 
Lower 
95% 
 
Upper 
95% 
 
Lower 
95.0% 
 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -8.627 4.021 -2.145 0.069 -18.135 0.882 -18.135 0.882 
HERF 27.098 15.981 1.696 0.134 -10.692 64.887 -10.692 64.887 
Rc 7.312 2.857 2.559 0.038 0.556 14.068 0.556 14.068 
Ir -0.084 0.099 -0.854 0.422 -0.318 0.149 -0.318 0.149 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this result is that there is no econometrical evidence on the 
power of the theoretical model in its original form to predict NIMs in South Africa in the case where 
the data sets are derived from arithmetic averages of the four sample banks. 
  
The fact that the econometric results of the basic model are inconclusive may be attributable to the 
loss of the predictive power of the model that emanates from the impact of smoothing and averaging 
data at country-level. Since the arithmetic mean takes into account every value, including outliers, it 
can be affected by extreme values, especially so where the sample size is small. Smoothing and 
averaging of idiosyncratic characteristics of variables cannot be expected to capture all the intrinsic 
information available to the market. 
 
In light of the inconclusive results obtained using average data sets across the banks, the next logical 
step was to analyse the banks separately rather than for the whole country (represented by the 
averaged data series from the four sample banks). This study therefore estimated three models. 
Model one is at country-level using the average of each variable calculated each year by using data 
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from the four banks. Model two estimates the results by using all proposed independent variables for 
each individual bank. Model three excludes those insignificant variables identified through a general-
to-specific approach. 
 
4.6     Diagnostic tests results 
In order to employ the OLS technique in performing regression analysis on the individual banks, 
certain diagnostic tests must be carried out to ascertain that the assumptions of the CLRM are 
satisfied and the results are therefore valid. The following tests were carried out on each bank 
individually.  
 
4.6.1 Testing for zero mean of errors (residuals) (Assumption number one) 
The assumption is automatically satisfied if the intercept coefficients have a non-zero value. The 
intercept coefficients derived from the first-run regression specifications that included all the 
variables suggested by the model are Standard Bank (12.25), Nedbank (11.52), FNB (0.77) and 
ABSA (6.5) (see Appendix 1 showing first-run coefficient values). Assumption one is therefore 
satisfied in all cases. 
 
4.6.2 Testing for non-normality (Assumption number five) 
Data in the case of all four banks exhibits some form of skewness which indicates that the 
distribution is not entirely symmetric about its mean value. The data in all cases also showed some 
kurtosis that indicates that the tails are fatter or thinner than normal distribution. However, the 
asymmetry may be insignificant and is verified by using the Jarque-Bera statistic W, given in 
equation 31 and reproduced here for quick reference. 
        [
  
 
 
 
      
 
  
] 
 
Standard Bank 
The residuals (error terms) from the basic regression and definition of b1 and b2 from equation 31 are 
employed. 
T=11, b1 = -0.233, b2 = 1.869, therefore W = 0.685 > χ
2 (2) = 0.1026 at ά = 95% confidence level. 
The null hypothesis that the distribution of the series is symmetric and mesokurtic cannot be rejected. 
The non-symmetry of the distribution is therefore not significant. 
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Nedbank 
T=11, b1 = 1.142, b2 = 4.089, therefore W = 2.934 > χ
2 (2) = 0.1026 at ά = 95% confidence level.  
The null hypothesis that the distribution of the series is symmetric and mesokurtic cannot be rejected. 
The non-symmetry of the distribution is therefore not significant. 
FNB 
T=11, b1 = 0.172, b2 = 1.817, therefore W = 0.695> χ
2 (2) = 0.1026 at ά = 95% confidence level.  
The null hypothesis that the distribution of the series is symmetric and not mesokurtic cannot be 
rejected. The non-symmetry of the distribution is also not significant. 
ABSA 
T=11, b1 = 0.465, b2 = 1.460, therefore W = 1.484 > χ
2 (2) = 0.1026 at ά = 95% confidence level.  
The null hypothesis that the distribution of the series is symmetric and mesokurtic cannot be rejected. 
As with the other three banks, the non-symmetry of the distribution is also not significant. 
 
4.6.3 Testing for multicollinearity (Assumption number four) 
The OLS estimating technique assumes that the explanatory variables are not correlated with one 
another. If two or more variables are highly related the problem of muticollinearity exists (Brooks, 
2008:161). A correlation matrix method diagnostic test was performed on the explanatory variables 
to check for multicollinearity. Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 below present the correlation matrices for 
the independent variables for Standard Bank, Nedbank, FNB and ABSA respectively. 
 
TABLE 4.7: Standard bank correlation matrix 
  HERF  C R   Rc  Log Q Ir OC QM 
HERF 1        
 C 0.6254 1       
R 0.3003 0.7214 1      
  Rc 0.6487 0.9052 0.8068 1     
 Log Q -0.5095 -0.9274 -0.5447 -0.7879 1    
Ir 0.1028 -0.0579 -0.1707 -0.0507 -0.0475 1   
OC 0.4583 0.8437 0.8528 0.8567 -0.8194 0.0580 1  
QM 0.0817 0.7655 0.5350 0.5338 -0.7328 -0.2543 0.5975 1 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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TABLE 4.8: Nedbank correlation matrix 
  HERF C R  Rc Log Q Ir OC QM 
HERF 1        
C 0.1502 1       
R 0.2416 0.2570 1      
 Rc -0.2417 -0.0023 0.3430 1     
Log Q -0.5776 -0.6008 -0.5294 0.4404 1    
Ir 0.1028 -0.0652 -0.4095 0.0302 0.0645 1   
OC -0.2395 0.4845 0.1864 0.3146 -0.0186 -0.2688 1  
QM 0.1866 0.5485 -0.5874 -0.4784 -0.2560 0.4245 0.1316 1 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
 
TABLE 4.9: FNB correlation matrix 
 
   HERF C R  Rc Log Q  Ir OC QM 
 HERF 1        
C -0.4506 1       
R -0.4847 0.7930 1      
 Rc -0.3841 0.4485 0.2961 1     
Log Q -0.4200 0.3044 0.2143 0.9081 1    
 Ir 0.1028 -0.4729 -0.6114 -0.1593 0.0417 1   
OC -0.2939 0.3623 0.5423 0.4956 0.6754 -0.2066 1  
QM 0.1555 -0.5206 -0.2301 0.0665 0.1572 0.3159 0.1042 1 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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TABLE 4.10: ABSA correlation matrix 
  
          
HERF C  R     Rc Log Q  Ir  OC  QM 
 HERF 1        
 C 0.3037 1       
 R -0.5363 -0.5843 1      
 Rc 0.2351 0.8392 -0.6213 1     
Log Q -0.4819 -0.9046 0.8415 -0.8352 1    
 Ir 0.1028 0.0340 -0.1277 -0.1623 -0.0651 1   
 OC 0.7386 0.0854 -0.1219 -0.1920 -0.1672 0.0993 1  
 QM 0.1713 0.8473 -0.6490 0.8055 -0.8899 -0.1419 -0.0560 1 
 Source: Own deduction, 2011 
According to Mason and Lind’s study in 1996 (cited in Majumdar & Bacon, 2007), correlations of 
explanatory variables between -0.7 and +0.7 do not cause problems in terms of muticollinearity. 
Furthermore, near-multicollinearity can be ignored if the model is otherwise adequate statistically 
and coefficients are of plausible magnitude and have appropriate sign. 
 
 In terms of Standard Bank, explanatory variables correlations from Table 4.7 higher than +-0.7 are 
between variable C and R, Rc, Log Q and OC; OC and C, R, Rc and Log Q; QM and C, log Q; R and 
Rc; log Q and Rc. Since variables C, Rc, OC and QM are also not statistically significant these were 
dropped from the model (Brooks, 2008:173). 
 
Table 4.8 demonstrates that all explanatory variables for Nebdank are not mutually correlated with 
one another. All correlations are less than +-0.7. 
 
Near-multicollinearity is evident between R and C (+0.7930) and Log Q and Rc (+0.9081) in the case 
of FNB. Log Q variable could be dropped from the model since it is also not statistically significant. 
Variables R and Rc are of plausible magnitude and were retained in the model. 
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For ABSA, Table 4.9 demonstrates that near-multicollinearity is present between variables HERF 
and OC; C and Rc, Log Q, QM; R and Log Q; Rc and log Q, QM and Log Q and QM. Variable QM is 
also not statistically significant and therefore was dropped from the model (Brooks, 2008:173). 
 
4.6.4 Testing for autocorrelation (Assumption number three) 
Autocorrelation tests were carried out on the modified model after dropping of variables due to 
multicollinearity. Autocorrelations are said to be non-existent if the error terms are uncorrelated with 
one another (Brooks, 2008:139). 
 
Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 up to figure 4.16 show plots of the residual μ (the error term) versus 
time t (horizontal axis) and μt versus μt-1 for Standard Bank, Nedbank, FNB and ABSA. The 
graphical plot of µ and t must exhibit a random pattern (alternate positive and negative values of µ 
over time t) in the case where there is no autocorrelation. If the pattern is cyclic, exhibiting a sine 
curve that shows subsequent number of positive or negative values of µ before the sign of the values 
changes, it indicates a case of positive or negative autocorrelation. This is so since on average if the 
residual at time t-1 is positive, the residual at time t is likely also to be positive; similarly if residual 
at t-1 is negative the residual at time t is also likely to be negative (Brooks, 2008:141). 
 
The μt versus μt-1 graph must not exhibit any pattern at all if autocorrelation is not present since the 
points of the graph will be randomly distributed across the four quadrants of the graph. In the 
presence of autocorrelation the scatter plot points fall into the first and third quadrants for negative 
autocorrelation and into the second and fourth quadrant for positive autocorrelation (Brooks, 
2008:141). A straight line of best fit with a negative or positive slope can be seen to fit the data well 
where there is autocorrelation. 
 
The µ versus t and μt versus μt-1 graphical plots indicate that there is no autocorrelation for Standard 
Bank, and FNB data, while in the cases of Nedbank and ABSA graphical patterns suggest mildly 
autocorrelated series. The consequence of autocorrelation may lead to wrong standard error estimates 
resulting in wrong inferences, although in this case the problem would be very mild. 
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Standard Bank graphical results 
 
           FIGURE 4.9: Standard Bank μ - t graph 
  Source: Own deduction 
 
 
       FIGURE 4.10: Standard Bank μt - μt-1 graph 
  Source: Own deduction 
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     FIGURE  4.11: Nedbank μ - t graph 
  Source: Own deduction 
 
 
FIGURE 4.12: Nedbank μt - μt-1 graph 
  Source: Own deduction 
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         FIGURE 4.13: FNB μ - t graph  
  Source: Own deduction 
 
 
 
         FIGURE 4.14: FNB μt - μt-1 graph 
  Source: Own deduction 
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       FIGURE 4.15: ABSA μ - t graph 
     Source: Own deduction 
 
 
        FIGURE  4.16: ABSA μt - μt-1 graph 
  Source: Own deduction 
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incorrect estimation of the standard error terms. This may lead to incorrect and misleading inferences 
being made from the regression.The model tested and corrected for muticollinearity and serial 
correlation was further tested for heteroscedasticity using White’s test. White’s test basically 
investigates whether the variance of the error term var (μt) = σ
2 is constant. It works on running an 
auxiliary regression on the square of the error terms, μ2 and the original explanatory variables, their 
squares and the explanatory variable cross products. The results of the auxiliary regression were 
subjected to the Lagrange Multiplier test, which centers on the value of R2 (Brooks, 2008:134). 
 
Standard Bank heteroscedasticity test results 
The results of the White’s test auxiliary regression are presented in Table 4.11 below. 
TABLE 4.11: Standard Bank White’s test auxiliary regression results 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.9989        
R Square 0.9978        
Adjusted R2  0.9775        
Std Error 0.0072        
Observations 11        
  Coefficients Std Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -9.458 30.716 -0.308 0.810 -399.740 380.82 -399.7 380.824 
HERF -201.220 188.823 -1.066 0.480 -2600.440 2197.9 -2600. 2197.999 
C -243.175 29.117 -8.352 0.076 -613.142 126.79 -613.1 126.792 
R 65.412 6.822 9.588 0.066 -21.271 152.09 -21.27 152.095 
Log Q 16.968 2.741 6.190 0.102 -17.862 51.798 -17.86 51.798 
HERF2 353.384 355.686 0.994 0.502 -4166.033 4872.8 -4166. 4872.801 
C2 -2570.407 327.155 -7.857 0.081 -6727.308 1586.4 -6727. 1586.494 
R 2 -2115.020 219.448 -9.638 0.066 -4903.375 673.33 -4903. 673.334 
LogQ2 -1.777 0.245 -7.261 0.087 -4.886 1.332 -4.886 1.332 
HERF*C*R*LQ 4670.323 514.459 9.078 0.070 -1866.493 11207. -1866. 11207.13 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
 
 
95 
 
T (number of observations) =11, R2 = 0.9978, Test statistic=TR2= 11*0.9978=10.98. The test statistic 
will follow the chi-square, χ2 (9), under the null hypothesis that the coefficient parameters other than 
the constant terms in the auxiliary regression are all equal to zero. The number 9 represents the 
degrees of freedom which are simply the number of regressors in the auxiliary equation excluding 
the constant term. The corresponding five per cent critical value from the chi-square, χ2 (9) tables = 
16.919 > 10.98. The test statistic (10.98) is lower than critical value 16.919 therefore the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the error terms is constant cannot be rejected. The assumption of 
homoscedasticity is satisfied for the Standard Bank data. 
 
  Nedbank heteroscedasticity test results 
TABLE 4.12: Nedbank White’s test regression results 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.9247        
R Square 0.8551        
Adjusted R2  -0.4489        
Stnd Error 0.0053        
Observations 11        
  Coefficients Std Error t Stat 
P-
value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -0.3241 2.7124 -0.119 0.9243 -34.7889 34.1407 -34.7889 34.1407 
C 4.1335 4.8854 0.8461 0.5529 -57.9411 66.2082 -57.9411 66.2082 
Rc -1.4134 1.6002 -0.883 0.5394 -21.7462 18.9194 -21.7462 18.9194 
Log Q 0.2601 1.0953 0.2375 0.8516 -13.6572 14.1774 -13.6572 14.1774 
Ir 0.0264 0.0712 0.3708 0.7740 -0.8786 0.9314 -0.8786 0.9314 
C2 -49.8255 56.8529 -0.876 0.5419 -772.2105 672.5594 -772.210 672.5594 
Rc2 1.0525 1.1503 0.9149 0.5283 -13.5638 15.6688 -13.5638 15.6688 
LogQ2 -0.0236 0.1037 -0.227 0.8575 -1.3410 1.2938 -1.3410 1.2938 
Ir
2 -0.0011 0.0098 -0.112 0.9290 -0.1255 0.1233 -0.1255 0.1233 
C*Rc*Lg Q*Ir -0.1968 0.7145 -0.275 0.8289 -9.2759 8.8824 -9.2759 8.8824 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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T (number of observations) =11, R2 = 0.8511, Test statistic=TR2= 11*0.8511=9.362. The 
corresponding five per cent critical value from the chi-square, χ2 (9) tables = 16.919 > 9.3621. The 
test statistic (9.3621) is lower than critical value 16.919 and therefore the null hypothesis that the 
variance of the error terms is constant cannot be rejected. The assumption of homoscedasticity is 
satisfied for the Nedbank data series. 
 
  FNB heteroscedasticity test results 
TABLE 4.13: FNB White’s test auxiliary regression results 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.7071        
R Square 0.5000        
Adjusted R2  -0.6666        
Stnd Error 0.040591        
Observation 11 
 
       
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -2.5255 7.3761 -0.3424 0.7546 -25.9994 20.9485 -25.9994 20.94 
C 30.7202 77.9509 0.3941 0.7199 -217.3543 278.7947 -217.354 278.7 
R 56.3105 101.8209 0.5530 0.6188 -267.7292 380.3502 -267.729 380.3 
Rc 1.0764 26.2484 0.0410 0.9699 -82.4578 84.6106 -82.4578 84.61 
C2 -418.1401 1556.4494 -0.2686 0.8056 -5371.456 4535.176 -5371.45 4535. 
R 2 -399.4235 1069.3725 -0.3735 0.7336 -3802.644 3003.79 -3802.64 3003. 
Rc
2 -0.7998 27.4702 -0.0291 0.9786 -88.2222 86.6226 -88.222 86.62 
C*R*Rc -294.5410 3217.0108 -0.0916 0.9328 -10532.50 9943.423 -10532.5 9943. 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
 
T (number of observations) =11, R2 = 0.5000, Test statistic=TR2= 11*0.5000 =5.5000. The 
corresponding five per cent critical value from the chi-square, χ2 (7) tables = 14.067 > 5.5000. The 
test statistic (5.5000) is lower than critical value of 14.067; therefore the null hypothesis that the 
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variance of the error terms is constant cannot be rejected. The assumption of homoscedasticity is 
satisfied for the FNB data series. 
 
ABSA heteroscedasticity test results 
In the case of ABSA, the number of auxiliary regression equation explanatory variables at 13 is more 
than the number of observations of 11. This makes the regression format out of range. According to 
Hyndman and Kostenko (2007:13), minimum sample requirements dictate that the number of data 
points required for any statistical model must be more than the coefficients (parameters). The 
heteroscedasticity test cannot therefore be successfully performed for ABSA. 
 
Summary of diagnostic tests 
Following the diagnostic tests on the model to determine whether the OLS estimation technique is 
valid by meeting certain fundamental assumptions, the following could be concluded: 
 Mean values of the residuals (errors terms) are zero in all of the four banks’ regression series 
because the intercepts coefficients are all non-zero.  
 Except for ABSA, whose auxiliary regression could not be estimated due to its structure, 
there is statistical evidence that the error terms are homoscedastic. 
 There is no autocorrelation of explanatory variables in all the four cases. 
 Multicollinearity is not an issue in the estimations as no two variables are highly correlated in 
all the four cases. 
 Normality can be assumed for the distribution of the error terms for the four banks. 
 
4.7    Empirical results 
The model presented in equation 25 forms the basis of the regression estimation. A general-to-
specific approach as advocated by Brooks (2008:191) was adopted in order to build a model which 
satisfies the assumptions of the Classical Linear regression model (CLRM) OLS estimation 
technique. The approach involves starting with a large model and restricting, rearranging and 
removing some variables until a parsimonious formulation is reached that gives the most robust 
empirical findings. 
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The complex nature of the analysis tools and level of data required prevented the use of the panel 
data estimation technique. The OLS technique is used under the assumption of normality, 
homoscedasticity, no multicollinaearity and no autocorrelation. However, the ABSA regression 
series could not be tested for heteroscedasticity due to the structure of the auxiliary regression 
specification. This may cause incorrect inferences to be drawn. 
 
The initial eight independent variables are predetermined as they are derived from the theoretical 
model. The ninth variable, IIP was discarded from the model due to lack of data in the appropriate 
format for one of the banks. 
 
The following provides empirical evidence on the determinants of bank net interest margins for the 
four banks chosen as the sample. 
 
Standard Bank results 
The first results of bank level regression from the theoretic model showed that all the proposed 
variables, the Structure of the market HERF, Average operating costs C, Degree of risk aversion R, 
Credit risk exposure Rc, Size of operations Q, Volatility of interest rate Ir, Opportunity cost of 
reserves OC and Quality of management, QM, are statistically insignificant as measured by the t-
statistic. This means that the theoretical model in its original form does not have the predictive power 
to estimate the NIM for Standard Bank. 
 
A general-to-specific approach was applied which resulted in a formulation with only three 
statistically significant independent variables; HERF, R and Log Q. The fourth variable C is not 
statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.1318). However, relaxation of C out of the model renders other 
variables and the model insignificant. This may mean that the average cost variable may not have a 
singular causative effect on NIM but is conditional upon the other three variables. Macroeconomic 
factors as represented by the money market interest rate volatility do not appear to be relevant factors 
that explain changes in NIM for Standard Bank.  
 
Table 4.14 below reports the results from the regression of the final formulation. 
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TABLE 4.14: Standard Bank regression statistics 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.9605        
R Square 0.9225        
Adjusted R2  0.8708        
Std Error  0.2364        
Observation 11        
  Coefficients 
 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -12.087 7.136 -1.694 0.141 -29.548 5.374 -29.54 5.374 
HERF 122.022 28.177 4.331 0.005 53.076 190.968 53.076 190.96 
 C -98.293 51.844 -1.896 0.107 -225.150 28.564 -225.1 28.564 
R 33.975 12.901 2.634 0.039 2.408 65.543 2.408 65.543 
 Log Q -2.790 1.025 -2.723 0.034 -5.297 -0.283 -5.297 -0.283 
 Source: Own deduction, 2011 
The R2 value of 92.25% means that the final model with four independent variables has very high 
explanatory power for the movements in NIM for Standard Bank. 
  
The positive sign and size of coefficients for HERF and R and the negative sign for Log Q agree with 
theory. If the competitiveness of the market reduces, which is measured by the increasing market 
power HERF, the bank must be able to increase its NIM. Banks that are risk-averse are bound to 
increase NIMs to cushion themselves in the face of increasing risk. Though Maudos and Guevara 
(2003:8) may have claimed that NIM is an increasing function of average size of operations, the 
negative sign on Log Q agrees with Zuzana and Tigran (2008:8-9) who favoured lower margins due 
to economies of scale. 
 
Coefficients for HERF (122) and R (33) are very high, pointing to the fact that the competitive 
structure of the market and the propensity to risk aversion of Standard Bank has a huge influence on 
the bank’s interest profits. The positive and significant coefficient of the HERF variable supports the 
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market power framework. The framework is based on the hypothesis that bank concentration and 
other impediments to open market competition create an environment that affects bank conduct and 
performance 
 
Nedbank results 
As with Standard Bank, the regression of the basic model does not yield any significant variables. 
Again, this means that the theoretical model in its original form does not have the predictive power 
to estimate NIM changes for Nedbank. 
 
Four variables remain significant after applying a general-to-specific approach. The variables are 
average operating costs C, Credit risk exposure RC, size of operations measured by Log Q and 
interest rate volatility   . Table 4.15 shows the results from the regression of the final formulation for 
Nedbank. 
TABLE 4.15: Nedbank regression statistics 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics         
Multiple R 0.9898        
R Square 0.9797        
Adjusted R2 0.9662        
Std Error  0.0781        
Observation 11        
  
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 3.1136 0.8396 3.7086 0.0100 1.0593 5.1680 1.0593 5.1680 
C -15.5207 4.9165 -3.1569 0.0196 -27.5508 -3.4905 -27.550 -3.4905 
 Rc 8.7469 0.5690 15.371 0.0000 7.3545 10.139 7.3545 10.1392 
LogQ -1.0869 0.1633 -6.6567 0.0006 -1.4864 -0.6874 -1.4864 -0.6874 
Ir -0.2751 0.0397 -6.9308 0.0004 -0.3722 -0.1780 -0.3722 -0.1780 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
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Almost 98% of the change in NIM can be attributed to these four independent variables. The positive 
sign and size of coefficients for Rc and negative sign for Log Q agree with theory.  Banks that are 
exposed to greater risk operate with higher margins as a risk premium. As in the case of Standard 
Bank, the negative sign on Log Q gives support to the economies of scale market power hypothesis 
and the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis. According to the Molyneux and Forbes study in 1995 
(cited in Maudos 1998:191) increased profits are assumed to accrue to more efficient banks because 
they are more efficient and not because of collusive activities.  
 
The high coefficient of average operating cost C (-15.5) albeit negative, seems to give support to the 
cost of goods sold hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that the NIM is influenced by the cost that 
emanates from the bank’s activity in the money market as a result of random arrival of deposits and 
demand for loans. The negative sign on the coefficient of average operating costs variable is in 
contradiction to theory that suggests that higher margins are required to cushion higher costs. 
However, both Nedbank and Standard Bank exhibit the same invert relationship between costs and 
NIMs. This may suggest that in a highly competitive and/or regulated market costs may rise without 
a corresponding rise in NIMs. The rising costs may actually reduce profits. Alternatively, as Al- 
Muharrami and Matthews (2009:4) explained, banks with superior management and/or production 
technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. Still, the explanation could be due to the 
X-efficiency hypothesis that postulates that more efficient banks have lower costs, higher profits and 
higher market shares due to their superior ability to minimise costs at any production level. The 
alternative Scale Efficiency perspective asserts that lower costs, higher profits and bigger market 
share accrues to those banks that produce closer to the minimum average cost point (Al-Muharrami 
& Matthews, 2009:197). 
 
Nedbank exhibits an inverse relationship between NIM and money market interest rate volatility, 
contrary to Maudos and Guevara (2003:8) who suggested that the more volatile the money market 
interest rates, the greater the market risk. Hence banks will find it necessary to operate with higher 
margins as a risk premium. However, Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998:20) found evidence that 
real interest rises do not increase margins as much in developed countries as in developing countries. 
This may be because deposit rates are not tied down by deposit rate ceilings in developed countries. 
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Unlike Standard Bank, the effects of market structure as represented by the HERF variable appear to 
be insignificant. In other words the market power of the bank does not seem to have explanatory 
power for the bank’s NIM behaviour. Nedbank may not have the capacity to influence the market 
due to its market share being the smallest at 20%.  
 
FNB results 
FNB regression analysis of the basic model, as with Standard Bank and Nedbank, also does not yield 
any significant variables. The final specification yielded three significant independent variables out 
of eight suggested by the basic theoretical model. These variables are: average operating costs C, 
degree of risk aversion R and credit risk exposure Rc. 
 
TABLE 4.16: FNB regression statistics 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.9316        
R Square 0.8680        
Adjusted R2  0.8114        
Std Error  0.2002        
Observations 11        
  Coefficients 
 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.1662 1.3165 0.1262 0.9031 -2.9468 3.2791 -2.9468 3.2791 
C 119.1861 25.8651 4.6080 0.0025 58.0248 180.34 58.0248 180.347 
R -55.5383 19.9648 -2.781 0.0272 -102.7474 -8.329 -102.747 -8.3291 
 Rc 5.2820 2.3444 2.2530 0.0589 -0.2617 10.825 -0.2617 10.8257 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
Table 4.16 indicates an R2 of 86.8% indicating that most of the changes in NIM are attributable to 
operational costs, the bank’s propensity for risk aversion and credit risk exposure. The positive sign 
and size of coefficients for Rc and negative sign for Log Q agree with theory.  Banks that are exposed 
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to greater risk operate with higher margins as a risk premium. As in the case of Standard Bank, the 
negative sign on Log Q may imply that economies of scale play a big part in determining the level of 
the margins.  
 
The positive sign on the average operating costs variable C agrees with theory but is opposite to 
Nedbank and Standard Bank who exhibit an invert relationship between costs and NIMs. This may 
mean that FNB requires higher margins to cushion the higher costs attributable to their large asset 
base.   
 
The Coefficient of Exposure to risk of default is small compared to the other factors, pointing to 
partial impact on margins.  
 
The negative sign on the coefficient of risk aversion R is unexpected and cannot be backed up by 
either theory or precedent studies. A possible explanation could be the impact of the National Credit 
Act (NCA) which curtails banks’ risk appetite, resulting in long-term benefits accruing to the banks. 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.15, and unlike Standard Bank and Nedbank, there is no evidence in 
support of significant impact of size of operation and interest rate volatility on NIM. For interest rate 
volatility, this is probably in line with Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998:20), who found evidence 
that real interest rate rises do not increase margins as much in developed countries than in developing 
countries. 
  
HERF variable’s lack of impact on NIM is unexpected. This is despite the fact that FNB enjoys the 
biggest market power, represented by its market share of 31% and would have been expected to 
exhibit some monopolistic power. 
 
ABSA results 
Table 4.17 below indicates that at 5% significance level, most independent variables are significant 
except for average operating costs C. Quality of Management variable QM is marginally insignificant 
with a t-statistic of 1.4316 compared to critical value of 1.9432. It can be inferred that Quality of 
management has a partial explanatory power for the NIM in ABSA’s case.  
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The regression results presented in Table 4.17 confirm that the specification fits the theoretical model 
very well for the case of ABSA. 
TABLE 4.17: ABSA regression statistics 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.9943        
R Square 0.9887        
Adjusted R2  0.9623        
Std Error 0.0684        
Observation 11        
  Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -9.7134 6.3565 -1.5281 0.2239 -29.9427 10.516 -29.942 10.516 
HERF 102.0755 13.1336 7.7721 0.0044 60.2787 143.87 60.278 143.87 
 R 26.3539 6.6520 3.9618 0.0287 5.1842 47.523 5.1842 47.523 
 Rc -4.9723 1.7890 -2.7794 0.0690 -10.6657 0.7210 -10.665 0.7210 
LogQ -2.0110 0.7438 -2.7037 0.0736 -4.3781 0.3561 -4.3781 0.3561 
 Ir -0.1757 0.0497 -3.5379 0.0384 -0.3337 -0.0177 -0.3337 -0.0177 
 OC -22.2239 3.9930 -5.5657 0.0114 -34.9314 -9.5164 -34.931 -9.5164 
 QM 0.0188 0.0132 1.4316 0.2477 -0.0230 0.0607 -0.0230 0.0607 
Source: Own deduction, 2011 
The average R2 at 98.89% indicates that the variables posited by the theoretical model have a very 
high explanatory power for changes in NIM.  
 
Unexpected from the results is the negative coefficient for opportunity cost of reserve OC variable. 
The additional cost of holding reserves depends on the size of the reserve and the opportunity cost of 
holding the reserve. A positive relationship between NIM and opportunity cost would therefore be 
expected.  
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The negative sign on the coefficient for credit risk Rc is debatable. According to Maudos and 
Guevara (2003:13) and Flamini et al. (2009:7) the standard asset pricing theory dictates that a 
positive relationship is to be expected between NIMs and credit risk. Banks faced with higher loan 
defaults will apply a risk premium that will reflect in higher margins. In contrast, Hanweck and Ryu 
(2005:20) predicted a negative relationship based on the decreased credit quality of the borrower that 
would increase the bank’s credit risk and therefore increase the value of the option to sell off the 
asset held by the bank as collateral. 
 
Summary of results 
Table 4.18 below summarises the relevant bank-level elements that explain net interest margins in 
South Africa. The determinants are grouped by bank and by t-statistic at a five per cent significance 
level. 
 
TABLE 4.18: Regression analysis results summary 
Bank Significant 
variable 
Sign and 
coefficient 
t-statistic at 5% 
significance 
Average coefficient of 
Determination R2 
(Goodness of fit) 
Standard 
Bank 
 
  Critical value     
t-statistic = 2.13 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 93.97% 
HERF +122.022 +4.33 
C -98.29 -1.89 
R +33.98 +2.63 
Log Q -2.90 -2.72 
Nedbank 
 
  Critical value     
t-statistic = 2.13 
C -15.52 -3.16 
Rc +8.75 +15.37 
Log Q -1.09 -6.66 
Ir -0.28 6.93 
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FNB   Critical value     
t-statistic = 2.35 
C +119.19 +4.61 
R -55.54 +2.78 
Rc +5.28 +2.25 
ABSA   Critical value t-
statistic = 1.89 
HERF +102.08 +7.77 
R +26.35 +3.96 
Rc -4.97 -2.78 
Log Q -2.01 -2.70 
Ir -0.18 -3.54 
OC -22.22 -5.57 
QM +0.02 +1.44 
 Source: Own deduction, 2011 
The results from the analysis of the four sample banks revealed a number of issues: banks in South 
Africa, as represented by the four sample banks, are not a homogeneous group in terms of elements 
that drive NIMs. There is no convergence on the set of significant factors to enable generalisation to 
the broader context. The impacts of the determinants are not consistent across the four banks. 
 
The high goodness of fit statistics for the four banks, ranging from 86.80% to 98.87%, indicates that 
the model explains the NIM environment in South Africa exceptionally well. The excluded implicit 
interest payments IIP variable may have little or no impact on NIMs. Average cost of operations C, 
degree of risk aversion R and credit risk exposure Rc exhibit different coefficient signs across banks. 
 
Contrary to expectation that market structure (measured by HERF) has a huge impact on NIMs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Flamini et al. 2009:13), evidence suggests that it has noticeable impact on only 
two of the four sample banks in South Africa, namely Standard Bank and ABSA. FNB’s NIM is not 
influenced by HERF, whereas it would have been expected to exhibit monopolistic power by virtue 
of being the biggest bank (by total assets). However, in the case of Standard Bank and ABSA, 
exceptionally high t-statistics (4.33 and 7.77) and coefficients (+122.022 and 102.080) respectively 
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suggest high explanatory power of market structure. To the extent that the banks’ ability to 
overcharge is a function of their market power, this result presents evidence of market power 
incidences in the banking sector in South Africa. 
 
There is very weak evidence concerning the relationship between average operating costs C and 
NIMs for Standard Bank and ABSA (t-statistic = 0.498 and 1.89 respectively). This is surprising 
since overhead costs are expected to be high in Sub-Saharan Africa and to be significant in 
influencing interest margins (Flamini et al. 2009:13). The coefficients in both cases are negative 
(ABSA -7.948; Standard Bank -98.29) which does not corroborate the theoretical model that predicts 
a positive relationship. According to Zuzana and Tigran (2008:9), Afanasieff (20002:12), Maudos 
and Guevara (2003:11) and Zhou and Wong (2008:43), banks that incur higher operating costs are 
able to transfer the costs to depositors and borrowers through higher margins in order to keep profits 
unaffected.  
 
The impact of average operating costs is significant only for two of the banks; Nedbank and FNB. 
Nevertheless, the significant and economically sizeable impact of this variable justifies the extension 
of the original Dealer model by Maudos and Guevara (2003) to include this important variable. The 
direction of the impact is, however, opposite: the impact is positive for FNB (+119.9) and negative 
for Nedbank (-15.52). The coefficients, however, are high, suggesting a very sizeable relationship. 
The positive relationship for FNB indicates that the bank transfers a portion of its operating costs to 
its borrowers and depositors (Flamini et al. 2009:13). A decline in the bank’s NIM must be preceded 
by a decline in its operating expenses. The negative sign for Nedbank does however seem to 
contradict the theoretical prediction.  
 
For Standard Bank, FNB and ABSA NIMs seem to react positively to risk aversion R, although the 
coefficient has a negative sign for FNB. These three banks are larger than Nedbank, in terms of total 
assets, suggesting that bigger banks are reluctant to expose their assets to undue risks. The 
coefficients are also highly significant (Standard Bank +33.98, FNB -55.54 and ABSA +26.35) 
pointing to relatively high explanatory powers.  
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Standard Bank is the only bank in the sample where credit risk exposure Rc, does not appear to 
influence the NIM to any significant level. However, the coefficient is negative and comparatively 
low for ABSA. This is not consistent with the theoretical model since banks are expected to apply 
risk premiums when faced with higher loan defaults. However, the negative sign may be justified on 
the basis of the Hanweck and Ryu (2005:20) study which predicted a negative relationship due to the 
increase in collateral asset value with increasing default risk. 
 
Log Q appears to have explanatory power in all cases excepting FNB. The impact of this variable 
was a priori undetermined. The coefficient negative signs, significant at five per cent level give 
support to the economies of scale market power hypothesis (Zuzana & Tigran, 2008:8-9). Larger 
banks make efficiency gains that are reflected in higher NIMs. The negative coefficient result may 
simply reflect scale inefficiencies. However, the finding contradicts Maudos and Guevara (2003:8) 
who predicted a positive relationship due to overheads that increase with size of operation. 
 
Nedbank and ABSA NIMs show sensitivity to short-term interest rate fluctuations as measured by 
interest rate volatility. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are low (-0.28 and -0.18 
respectively) suggesting limited importance in explaining NIM variations. 
  
Quality of management proxy has no significant effect in this estimation for all the banks. 
Nonetheless, results indicate a positive but insignificant explanatory power in ABSA’s case (t-
statistic =+1.44). 
 
With these results, it can be concluded that the evolution of the net interest margin in the banking 
sector of South Africa responds more to variations in average Operating cost C, Degree of risk 
aversion R, Credit risk exposure Rc and Size of operations log Q than to the market power of the 
banking firm HERF, Interest rate risk Ir, and the Opportunity cost of holding reserves OC.  
 
4.8    Comparison of determinants across markets 
Comparison of NIM determinants across markets is based on qualitative approach encompassing 
content analysis of a set of factors affecting the various regions. Content analysis is the coding of 
factors into conceptual categories for purposes of statistical analysis (Weber, 1990:87). Weber 
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further advises that content analysis is useful for examining trends and patterns or plots in a profile of 
data. Categories can be further grouped into themes, a commonality that possesses both descriptive 
content and evaluative significance (Miles and Huberman, 1994:42). According to Marshall and 
Rossman (1995:100-101), the analytic emphasis of categorisation requires a complementary analysis, 
synthesis and interrelation with whole narrative. 
 
Table 4.19 below indicates the significant determinants of NIMs both for South Africa and for those 
of other selected markets.  
TABLE 4.19: Comparison of net interest determinants across some major markets 
South Africa Brazil Mainland China Russia Europe Tunisia 
 
(Major ) 
Operating 
costs 
Risk Aversion 
Credit risk 
Operations  
Size 
(Minor ) 
Market 
Structure 
Interest rate  
Opportunity 
cost 
GDP 
Interest Rate 
Exchange Rate 
Inflation 
 
 
 
 
Market structure 
Operating costs 
Risk aversion 
Interest rate 
Credit risk 
operation size 
 
 
 
Bank ownership 
Risk aversion 
Credit risk 
operations size 
Liquidity 
 
Interest rate 
Credit risk 
Operating  costs 
Bank size 
Off- balance sheet 
items 
Market structure 
Regulation 
Income structure 
Labour 
productivity 
Capital 
productivity 
Operating costs 
Stock market 
development 
 
 
 (Latin 
America) 
Operating costs 
Liquidity 
Capital risk 
Interest rate 
Inflation 
GDP 
(Asia) 
Operating costs 
Capital amount 
Loan Quality 
Collateral Asset 
Liquid assets 
Interest rate 
market structure 
  Sub-Saharan 
Africa Credit risk 
Market structure 
Bank size 
Activity 
diversification 
Inflation 
Commodity 
prices. 
Regulation 
Source: compiled from several sources: see appendix 2 
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Determinants of NIMs for other markets indicated in the Table 4.19 above have been compiled from 
available studies that have been reviewed under the Literature Review section in chapter two. These 
studies employed various statistical analysis methods to establish relevant factors affecting NIM in 
various markets as noted in chapter two, Table 2.1.  
 
The relevant determinants for South Africa are divided into two groups. Those that affect more banks 
and are highly significant are termed ‘major’ while those that affect two or less banks are termed 
‘minor’. 
 
Categorisation of data from the narrative and table 4.19 above yields three categories namely:- 
1. Developed countries/regions category (Europe and USA) 
2. Developing countries/regions category (Sub-Saharan Africa, Tunisia, Latin America, Asia), 
3. In-between developed and developing countries category (Russia, Mainland China) 
  
Themes that emerge from the categorisation of the determinants of NIM into developed, developing 
and those whose level of development is between developed and developing can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Macro-economic factors 
2. Bank specific factors 
3. Mixture of (1) and (2) 
 
The major determinants in South Africa, Tunisia, mainland China and Russia appear to be bank-
specific, while in Brazil macroeconomic variables such as inflation, GDP, and interest rate volatility 
are predominant. In terms of region, Europe and Asia seem to be affected more by bank-specific 
variables than macroeconomic factors. Sub-Saharan Africa is affected more by macroeconomic 
factors than bank-specific factors while Latin America has a fine balance between the two. 
 
From pattern analysis above, it can be concluded that impacts of NIM determinants vary across 
countries and regions. The empirical findings do not suggest any form of pattern, nor systematic 
features across markets. The mixed results probably point to significant differences across the 
countries and regions in terms of the banking structures and risk profiles. The differences probably 
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arise because the banks in different countries and regions face different sets of challenges, adversities 
and survival options, thus requiring different growth strategies and pricing policies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1   Introduction 
South Africa has a well-developed and structured financial market, and according to the Banking 
Association of South Africa (2010) it compares favourably with developed countries. The regulatory 
environment and level of competition are comparatively high.  
 
With the central financial intermediation role the banks play in the country, it is important to 
understand how profitable, as measured by net interest margins, these banks are. It is also important 
to understand what generates the net interest margins in the context of bank efficiency and the 
competitive global market. The purpose of the study was to identify the determinants of net interest 
margins (NIMs) by examining selected financial institutions in South Africa.  
 
The study employed the theoretical Dealer model and its later modifications and extensions to 
analyse the determinants of NIMs using bank-level data. The model indicates that net interest 
margins are, in general, influenced by the competitive conditions of the market, operational costs, 
management aversion to risk, credit risk exposure, interest rate volatility and other elements not 
explicitly introduced into the model. These other variables include opportunity costs of reserves, 
payment of implicit interest and quality of management. 
 
The findings from the analysis of the four sampled banks were generalised to the broader South 
African banking industry. The objective of generalisation was to enable comparison with other 
external markets. Comparison of relevant net interest margin determinants would establish 
similarities and differences across markets. Common NIM determinants across markets would 
confirm or reject the perception that NIM rates are higher in South Africa, signifying market 
inefficiencies.  
 
The study revealed that there is a large disparity among countries in terms of the determinants of net 
interest margins. The disparity, as explained by Chen (2009:19), is attributable to the different 
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environments and risk profiles the banks face in their respective countries and regions in which they 
operate.  
 
In this chapter the findings and interpretation of results are presented in section 5.2. Limitations of 
the study and recommendations for further studies are presented in section 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
The chapter concludes with final remarks on the research study in section 5.5. 
  
5.2   Discussion of study findings 
The study employed the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimating technique to identify determinants of net interest margins for the biggest 
four banks in South Africa: Standard Bank, Nedbank, FNB and ABSA. The sample period was from 
2000 to 2010 and data was obtained from Bankscope. A fixed set of systematic factors that influence 
net interest margins was derived from the original theoretical Dealer model and its various 
modifications and extensions.  
 
There is no precedent study that has exclusively dealt with South Africa to act as a benchmark for 
this study. This study therefore adopted frameworks used by other studies from elsewhere; namely 
those of Maudos and Guevara (2003), Zhou and Wong (2008) and Zuzana and Tigran (2008).  
 
A number of mandatory diagnostic tests were carried out to test whether the assumptions made from 
the OLS estimating technique chosen for analysis were not violated. The OLS estimating technique 
relies, among others, on the assumption that data distribution is generally normal or nearly so. Test 
results indicated that the null hypothesis that the distribution of the series is symmetric and 
mesokurtic could not be rejected. This means that the non-symmetry of the distributions was not 
statistically significant for all of the four sample banks’ data.  
 
The heteroscedasticity test required to test that residuals have a constant variance, could not be 
carried out in ABSA’s case due to the structure of the auxiliary regression equation. The implication 
of not testing for hetroscedasticity is that there are no guarantees that inferences made from the 
analysis results are not misleading (Brooks, 2008:135). 
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The study provides evidence that the theoretical model developed by Ho and Saunders (1981) and its 
various extensions largely explains the NIM environment of the four biggest banks in the South 
African banking sector. The high values of goodness of fit statistics, ranging from 86.8% to 98.87%, 
mean that the model explains the NIM variations of the four banks exceptionally well. 
 
The result largely agrees with results for mainland China (Zhou & Wong, 2008) and Russia (Zuzana 
& Tigran 2008) that the major drivers of NIMs are bank-specific. The study identified the major 
factors that impact banks as the average operating costs, degree of risk aversion, credit risk exposure 
and size of operations. These factors have wide and huge implications on banks’ interest income 
pricing strategies in South Africa. Less common but still significant are factors such as the 
competitive structure of the market, interest rate volatility and opportunity costs of holding 
regulatory reserves. These are less common in the sense that they affect fewer banks. 
 
Contrary to expectations for banks in Sub-Saharan Africa, the structure of the market influence, 
though very significant where it applies, is not as widespread across banks as posited by the 
theoretical model and some empirical studies. In this respect this might be evidence that the South 
African banking system is well developed and comparable to developed economies where 
competition and efficiency are high. The result that some banks are not influenced by market 
structure demonstrates that high concentration does not necessarily mean that there is lack of 
competition among South African banks. It may also mean that these banks do not necessarily 
exercise market power in the conventional and traditional loan and deposit products. This power 
could be exerted on some other less conventional or new products and services. It may also mean 
that market power is not relevant in these traditional deposit and loan activities but is applied 
elsewhere on some other services and products. 
 
Similarly, interest rate volatility impact does not apply to all banks but is limited to a few. This is 
also in contrast with the expectation that macroeconomic variables are highly significant in Sub- 
Saharan Africa due to unstable economic environments (Flamini et al. 2009:3). This could be also an 
indication that South Africa is exceptional in Sub-Saharan Africa. That interest rate volatility does 
not affect all banks may indicate differences in their assets and liabilities structures. The impact of 
interest rates on NIMs may be subject to significant nonlinearities and regulatory environments. 
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Average production costs, management aversion to risk, credit risk exposure and size of operations 
of banks are major determinants of net interest margins in South Africa. This means that containment 
of production costs has a huge effect on the cost of banking services that the consumer finally pays 
for. In terms of credit risk, the variable exerted sizeable positive and significant effects on NIMs for 
some banks. This suggests that risk-averse shareholders aim for risk adjusted returns and seek bigger 
earning to compensate for the higher risk. In this regard, the National Credit Act that regulates and 
controls the credit market could be considered necessary. The impact of size of operations on NIMs 
clearly indicates economies of scale benefits to the end user, pointing to the desirability of having 
large and stable banks in an economy. 
 
In comparison with other factors, net interest margins for the four biggest commercial banks in South 
Africa appear to be insensitive to the quality of management at the helm of these institutions. This is 
probably a confirmation of the less important role this variable plays in the determination of interest 
margins. Quality of management was not included in the set of explanatory variables in the original 
model pioneered by Ho and Saunders (1981). It was added into the model as a modification by 
Maudos and Guevara (2003), who concurred with Angbazo (1997) that quality of management plays 
a part in distorting pure margin, as good management is able to choose highly profitable assets and 
low-cost liabilities. 
 
Net interest margin drivers in South Africa are categorically different from other markets. Hanweck 
and Ryu (2005:10) recognised that the banking industry is not homogeneous. It differs in product 
ranges, business models, pricing power and funding structure. These bank characteristics affect net 
interest margin sensitivity in different ways hence margin levels are bound to be different. There is 
therefore no basis for comparison of determinants across markets subjected to different economic 
environments. Absolute margins in South Africa may appear high but when the economic and 
environmental factors are taken into account the relative margins may not be overpriced. 
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5.3   Limitations of the study 
The most important limitation of this study is that there are no similar previous analytical studies for 
South Africa. As a result there are no benchmarks with which to compare the results of the study. In 
this respect validation of the results of this study is not possible although desirable. 
 
Explanatory variables used in this study were obtained from the theoretical model. No other variables 
chosen a priori were included in the model. There is a risk that important bank-specific variable/s 
could have been omitted. According to Brooks (2008:179) the consequence of omitting a relevant 
variable is that the estimated coefficients on all the other variables will be biased and inconsistent 
unless the excluded variable is uncorrelated with all the included variables. Inferences made from the 
model could be inappropriate. The risk of bias and inconsistency is, however, low considering the 
high values of goodness of fit statistics which indicate that the sample regression function closely fits 
the data. 
 
Another limitation of the study is that regression analysis was limited to the four biggest commercial 
banks in South Africa due to data unavailability for the other banks. Generalisability of the study to 
the broader commercial bank market in the whole of the country is therefore limited. The bigger 
banks, by their sheer size and market influence, may be facing a completely different set of 
challenges and risks as compared to the smaller banks. In addition, contrasting results in terms of 
expected impacts on NIMs obtained across the four banks makes generalisation context sensitive.  
There could be large disparities among the banks in terms of the way in which they are affected by 
the environment. 
 
The data horizon from 2000 to 2010 presented another challenge for the study. In terms of minimum 
sample requirements, the time horizon is short. According to Hyndman and Kostenko (2007:13) it is 
always necessary to have more observations than parameters to be estimated. The basic model has 
eight parameters to be estimated against 11 annual observations (2000-2010). Though theoretically 
feasible for the primary regression equations, depending on the data randomness, the margin is too 
tight. The impact of small sample size, however, was reduced through the general-to-specific 
approach of building a robust model that removed insignificant variables from the specifications. 
Reducing explanatory variables reduced the number of parameters to be estimated.  
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Within the same realm, the auxiliary regression equation to diagnose heteroscedasticity for ABSA 
yielded more regressors than the number of observations. This made the regression specification out 
of range and thus parameters could not be estimated. It cannot therefore be said with confidence that 
inferences for ABSA are appropriate since whether or not the data series met all the assumptions of 
the OLS estimating technique could not be established.  
 
Although the Implicit Interest Payment (IPP) variable is not included in the original theoretical 
model it was incorporated into the model in later modifications by Maudos and Guevara (2003:73) 
and Zhou and Wong (2008:44), implying that it could have some explanatory power in some 
settings. However for this study the variable was omitted due to lack of data in the appropriate 
format for one of the banks. According to Brooks (2008:178) there is consequence for omitting from 
the estimated regression a variable that is a determinant of the dependent variable. The estimated 
coefficients on all the other variables will be biased and inconsistent unless the omitted variable is 
uncorrelated with all the included variables. Forecasts made from the model would be biased and 
hypothesis testing could yield inappropriate inferences. As in the case of possible exclusion of bank-
specific variables, the risk of bias and inappropriate inferences is however low considering the high 
values of goodness of fit statistics showing that the sample regression function fits the data well 
(Brooks 2008:107). 
 
Another limitation of this study is that it strictly followed the Dealer model, which is a static model 
that allows only for a contemporaneous relationship between the variables instead of being a 
dynamic model. According to Hanweck and Ryu (2005:10) the theoretical Dealer model itself has a 
great limitation for being single horizon and static, assuming homogeneous assets and liabilities with 
the same reference rate. In reality bank portfolios are heterogeneous with different security, maturity 
and repricing structures that in most cases extend beyond a single horizon. Such portfolios lend 
themselves to analysis by dynamic models. Dynamic models, according to Brooks (2008:153), can 
capture the effects of the lagged values on the current values of variables. Through the general-to-
specific approach, variables could possibly have been eliminated from the model because they were 
not significant whereas their lagged values could have been significant.  
 
 
 
118 
 
5.4 Study implications, recommendations and suggestions on further studies 
5.4.1   Study implications 
This study has important implications for policymakers, banks and the public. There is pressure on 
policymakers to make comparisons with external markets and set up policies accordingly. The 
guideline generated by this study for policy setters is that drivers of NIMs are underpinned by 
different environmental influences that must inform the supervisory and regulatory frameworks 
appropriately. 
 
In terms of banks, the implication is that there are clearly distinct bank-specific factors that have a 
significant impact on net interest margins and eventually on bank profitability. The onus on the 
banks is to identify and manage these factors. This study identified average operating costs, risk 
aversion, credit risk exposure, size of operations, structure of the market and opportunity cost of 
holding reserves, as important bank-specific risk elements that can be diversified. 
 
In South Africa the financial system is predominantly bank-based, indicating the fundamental role 
banks play in the economic growth of the country. Though high margins can contribute to the 
strengthening of the banking system, overly high margins may be a reflection of banking system 
inefficiencies that are transferred to the public through high intermediation costs that negatively 
impact on investments. As Maudos and Guevara (2003:2) pointed out, it is important that the 
intermediation role performed by banks be carried out at the lowest possible cost in order to achieve 
greater social welfare. 
 
5.4.2   Recommendations 
Based on the important implications this study has on the banking industry in South Africa and its 
stakeholders, the following recommendations are made.  
 Since no analytical studies could be accessed for South Africa at the time of submitting 
this research, it is recommended that future studies on the same subject use this research 
as reference to validate results.  
 Due to the limited generalisability of this study because of a small sample size, there is 
scope for future studies to broaden the sample period and size to include as many 
commercial banks as possible.  
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 Due to the limitations of static models for studies of this nature, it is recommended that 
future studies adopt dynamic models as they capture the lag effects on the relationships 
between variables.  
 
5.5   Final remarks 
This study sought to achieve two main objectives as summarised below: 
 To identify the important factors that determine net interest margins in the South African 
commercial banking sector. 
 To gain a clear understanding of how the relevant determinants of net interest margins in 
South Africa compare with net interest margins in other selected markets. 
 
Through the literature review, a comprehensive appreciation of net interest margins in other markets 
was gained from review of previous studies. This study achieved the first objective by identifying the 
significant determinants of net interest margins in South Africa as operating costs, risk aversion, 
credit risk exposure and size of operations, interest rate volatility and opportunity costs of holding 
reserves. 
 
In meeting the second objective, the study succeeded in pooling the determinants of net interest 
margins for other markets from various previous studies. The comparison with South Africa 
indicated that these determinants are largely different due to different environmental influences. The 
inference is that comparison and bench-marking of net interest margins levels from different markets 
does not make economic sense. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A-1:  Non-zero coefficient intercepts from first-run regression equations combining all 
suggested variables. 
a) Standard Bank 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 12.25956 33.57936 0.365092 0.750036 
-
132.221 156.7399 
-
132.221 156.7399 
         
 
 
b) Nedbank 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercep 11.5185 8.67256 1.328154 0.3154202 -25.796 48.8335 -25.796 48.833534 
         
 
c) FNB 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.774801 15.61244 0.049627 0.96493 
-
66.4001 67.94972 
-
66.4001 67.94972 
         
 
d) ABSA 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -6.565 9.686 -0.678 0.568 -48.242 35.112 -48.242 35.112 
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Appendix A-2:  Sources used to compile and compare determinants of NIM for various 
regions/countries. 
Region/ Country Source  Author  Date of the 
works 
Latin America Understanding the behavior of bank 
spreads in Latin America, Journal of 
Development Economics. 
Brock and Saurez 2000 
Banking Spreads in Latin America. 
IMF Working Paper 06/44. 
Gelos 2006 
Europe Commercial banks, Net Interest 
Margins, Default risk, Interest rate 
Risk and off balance sheet Banking, 
Journal of Financial Services 
Research. 
Angbazo 1997 
The determinants of bank interest 
margins: an international study, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 
Saunders and 
Schumacher 
2000 
Factors explaining the interest Margin 
in the Banking Sectors of the European 
Union, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 
Maudos and 
Guevara 
2003 
Determinants of Bank Interest margins 
in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
comparison with the West, Research 
Department, Sveriges Riksbank. 
Claeys and Vennet 2007 
Asia Determinants of Bank Net Interest 
Margins of South-East Asia, ISI 
business journal. 
Doliente 2003 
 The Determinants of Commercial 
Bank Profitability in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper WP/09/15. 
Flamini, Mcdonald 
and Schumacher 
2009 
Brazil The determinants of bank interest 
spreads in Brazil, Central Bank of 
Brazil Working Papers 
Alfanassieff, 
Lhacer and Nakane 
2002 
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Russia The determinants of Bank interest 
margins in Russia: Does Bank 
Ownership matter?, Bank of Finland 
Article 
Zuzana and Tigran 2008 
China The determinants of Net Interest 
Margin of commercial banks in 
Mainland China, Emerging Markets 
Finance & Trade journal 
Zhou and Wong 2008 
Tunisia The determinants of the Tunisian 
Banks’ Performance, Journal of 
Applied Financial Economics, 
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